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GROSS INVESTMENT in road and equipment of the railroads of the
United States is currently shown on the books of the companies
as some $29 billion, primarily a valuation in terms of historical cost.
About two thirds of this amount is for fixed property, or roadway
and structures, and one third is for rolling stock, or equipment. By
all odds the biggest single item is that for freight cars, being half as
much again as that for locomotives and about the same as the
combined items for land and grading for the roadway. Regionally,
the distribution of the investment is between $11 billion and $12
billion each in the eastern and western districts and half that amount
in the South. In terms of current dollars the gross annual addition to
the investment accounts during the 1920's, when this statistic was
first compiled, ranged from $430 million to $1.06 billion. In the
depression of the 1930's it dropped to $100 million and in the course
of the recovery prior to World War II it twice exceeded $500 million.
Since that war it has varied from $860 million to $1.4 billion. In real
terms the gross annual addition since World War II has fallen
considerably below that of the 1920's, since the weighted index of
capital goods prices has doubled. Both the functional and the
regional distribution of the annual expenditures have shifted notice-
ably with time. In the 1920's fixed property expenditures were
double those for equipment, in the years following World War II
the latter became three times the former. In the 1920's the East's
expenditures were somewhat more than the West's, and the South's
were but half of the West's. In the postwar years the western
expenditures exceeded the eastern, and the southern were two
thirds of the eastern. These are the over-all accounting summaries of
the investment whose stabilization has long been a subject of discus-
sion, though surprisingly little has been achieved.'
The life of the capital equipment representing this investment is
roughly indicated by the depreciation rates used for accounting
purposes, rates based on life studies. The average for all items for
1InterstateCommerce Commission, Statistics of Railways in the U.S., 1920-
1949, statements 46-47 to 1987, tables 187-139 thereafter.
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which depreciation is accrued, which excludes rails, fittings, ties,
and ballast, indicates a forty-year life. For the items for which most
present-day investment is made, the life ranges from twenty-five to
forty years.2
From the point of view of regularization, two aspects of the varia-
tions in investment may be considered.8 The first relates to what
may be identffied as the internal problem of the industry, the
problem of why these variations occur; whether they are internal
responses to outside changes or responses to purely internal changes
such as technical innovations. The second raises questions about
the external relationships of the industry's investment with the
economy as a whole, which may in turn have feed-back effects on
the railroads themselves. The first is relatively the easier aspect to
deal with and is the one with which most industry representatives
would be content to terminate whatever thinking they do about
regularization. The second is nebulous. Railroad influences merge
with those of other industries in ways which discourage investiga-
tion, and in empirical terms it is difficult to tell which is the cart
and which the horse in distinguishing between external relationships
and the internal factors. This paper deals primarily with the internal
problem.
The In.stitutional Pattern of investment Decision Making
Each industry-wide increment to railroad investment in road and
equipment is timed and has its magnitude and character determined
by decisions made company by company. Thus a general review
of the decision-making process based on the author's experience at
both staff and director levels, together with a field study of practices
of various companies, provides a necessary background for the sub-
sequent consideration of capital expenditures in detail.
Roughly, it appears that investment decisions are primarily the
2ibid.,1949, table 96.
8Attentionshould be called to the fact that fluctuation of economic activity
in the railroad field involves variations of investment not only in plant but also
in both inventory of materials and supplies used currently and maintenance of
the plant. The balance sheet figure for the former varied from a peak of $767
million in the 1920's, to $296 million in 1933, to a higher peak of million
in 1948. The annual magnitude of the maintenance expenditure ranged around
$2.3 billion during the 1920's, dropped to a low of $937 million in the middle
thirties, and has more recently been just under $3 billion. ibid., 1949, table 155.
These two items involve variations that are important, though proportionately
not as great as has been the case with gross investment. Neither of them is
considered in this paper.
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concern of the directors and top officers of a company. This is not
to say that the lower echelons do not make studies and proposals,
but rather that the significant decisions, as anyone that has been in
the lower levels well knows, rest with the "top brass." Only at this
high level are the technical considerations, the appraisal of the
future situation, and the financial aspects all brought together. It is
also general practice that all but minor proposals be passed upon
by the directors, though it is safe to say that in many companies the
directors do little but concur in the judgment of the top officers.
This is particularly the case with the usual outside director who is
connected with nonfinancial business, who is busy with his own
affairs, who is not thoroughly versed in railroad affairs, and who
must inevitably rely upon his officers for current information. The
financially connected director does seem to contribute, for he can
advise concerning availability of credit and other financial matters.
The officer who is a director is only formally affirming his already
formed judgment. Thus, in the main, the top group of officers really
make the decisions with such financial advice as may be offered. At
the widest limits, this group would include the president and the
most directly concerned or most active vice presidents or, where
departmental heads are provided with more functional titles, the
general manager, general traffic manager, and chief financial officer.
In the narrower case, the president would assume the primary role,
or possibly two or three dominant members of the group of top
officers would be found to be the controlling people.
Whatever combination it may be, its decisions are influenced by,
among other things, certain mechanisms and routines that become
established in the typical railroad company's organization. While
companies have certain common characteristics in these matters,
there is a wide variation in how decisions are carried out. Relevant
to the problem of regularization, the mechanisms of particular
interest range from plans, through annual and monthly budgets, to
actual authorizations and orders, and finally to the accounts. Capital
plans may be laid out for an indeterminate period or for from one
to ten years. These plans vary from an expression of hopes or dreams
that everybody recognizes have little chance of fruition, to thor-
oughly realistic, carefully screened proposals that are to be carried
out when circumstances allow. All these plans are recognized as
subject to revision as technology, traffic, and other things change.
In general these plans perform the function of establishing current
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priorities among alternative possibilities. In but few cases do they
control timing except under most stable circumstances.
As plans come toward the point of being carried out, they are
projected into the budget procedure. The capital budget machinery
that projects beyond a year is more like planning than like budget-
ing. The annual budget is, in ordinary times, the first meaningful
estimate of expected expenditures; it is a generally respected top
limit and a reasonably firm allocation among various possibilities.
It reflects previous planning to varying degrees depending upon
how serious the top officers are about planning, how much they
look to the long run or how easily they are influenced by the vagaries
of the moment. There is wide variation among companies in this
respect. In some it is part of general policy always to chart the
future carefully and stick to the course; in others there is so little
aptitude in any area for working toward policy formation that plan-
ning is scarcely recognizable as a tool of management. Thus an
annual capital budget may represent widely different types of
decision making. It should be emphasized that in uncertain times
the annual budget may, even under the best of auspices, prove to
have little holding power. It can be whittled to pieces in the spring,
a few months after being solemnly affirmed, and totally revived
again in the fall to the astonishment of all concerned. In the most
uncertain times, even the operating budget becomes an unstable
thing as it deteriorates from an annual to a monthly or even to a
weekly level of commitment, but if the last stage is reached capital
expenditure may well have completely disappeared except as re-
quired by contractual or legal obligation.
Most frequently, annual capital budget timing has a set place in
the calendar, with crystallization and board authorization toward
the end of the year, in November or December. This is both because
of a cultural mold imposed by the contours of our calendar and
because the result of the previous fall's peak is sufficiently relevant,
particularly financially, to make it necessary to get an estimate of it
before commitments. It is also because outdoor work can be done
most efficiently in the summer, and peak loads are to be met in the
succeeding fall. Authorization in the previous winter provides the
time for plans to be made and orders completed. Sudden national
emergencies coming at odd times of the year give rise to marked
deviations from this pattern. The normal capital budget machinery
can have a substantial element of expenditure commitment, but one
must be wary of those companies that give only lip service to the
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budget, or those times when almost everyone must renege. To the
extent that the capital budget is carried out, it does establish a
timing of decisions tied to the calendar year.
Capital budgets may move fairly quickly into actual force author-
izations, contract signing, and orders for materials and equipment.
Board authorization in November or December may result in orders
for new cars being placed in December or January, or for new rail
in December for deliveries in the following summer. On the other
hand, orders may be delayed to await more favorable conditions or
to take a last look at trends. Construction work, if done by company
forces, may call for early material orders, but labor-force authoriza-
tion does not come until spring, just before the work is to start.
Contract construction work may wait till late, too. In general, the
order or contract stage fixes expenditure commitment beyond the
company's control, though, again, in hard or uncertain times there
has been some reneging. For example, rail ordered for future de-
liveries has not been accepted, or else the delivery date has been
postponed for extended periods.
Once the orders or authorizations have been made and accom-
panied by expected progress and delivery dates, the basis is laid for
the first phase of the accounting department's statements, that is, the
estimates of the monthly cash requirements and the estimated
accounts for one, two, and three months ahead. The negotiations
and detail work for financing are also begun if outside financing is
involved, though some preliminary assessment of the problems may
well have accompanied the preparation of the annual budget.
Subsequently, the estimates of accounts and cash are revised each
month until thirty days or more after the end of a given month, the
final accounts are presented, still, however, with the estimate of
accruals remaining uncertain.
In general, the critical point in capital expenditure appears to be
placing the order, making the contract, or signing on the labor
force. At that time the investment expenditure is firmly committed,
and the expectations of others are definitely established. Thus for
the purposes of analysis, the timing of orders is the critical point.
Another variable in the decision-making process, probably more
important than this complex of financial studies and statements, is
the attitude of the top officers toward capital expenditures, their
character, magnitude, and timing. Some officers have a keen interest
in all the available improvements, and throughout the organization
there is a feeling that capital expenditures get a sympathetic recep-
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tion and that proposals for expenditure are to be actively developed
and passed on up for decision. Other top officers seem more in-
terested in squeezing everything possible out of existing plant; it
almost appears that they have to be bludgeoned into making a
capital expenditure by competition, group pressure, or a prepon-
derant example of prior advantageous use of facilities by others. A
different range of attitudes is evident when it comes to timing. Some
of the key group go all out during good times because it is easy to
find the needed money or because it is in the air. A few seriously
plan for capital expenditure over a long enough period so that the
possibility of getting things at lower prices during a contraction
may have an appeal and so that even in the trough of business fluc-
tuation there may still appear a reason for improving or expanding
facilities in terms of future higher levels of traffic. It would be pos-
sible to go on almost indefinitely enumerating various attitudes and
providing contrasts. But the key point is that there is this variation
and that it provides explanations for some aspects of total industry
behavior. This variation also gives grounds for hope that top
officers can more generally come to adopt attitudes favorable to
regularization of capital expenditures.
The Effect of Pro on Investment
Before moving into detailed examination of experience with in-
dividual classes of capital expenditures, it is of help to review the
general types of factors that might be expected to control relevant
decisions. The performance and profitability of the past year have
already been mentioned as one consideration. The immediate- and
near-future month-to-month record and estimates are also watched.
The comparative importance of the two varies with the degree of
long- or short-range viewing that managements do. Profitability
affects both the supply of internal funds for expenditures and the
credit position for obtaining external funds. During the 1920's some-
thing over one half of the gross investment in road and equipment
was paid for out of reservations of profit; the factor of profitability
is therefore critical just in terms of sheer mechanics of cash flow.
The profit factor is also important in determining ability to borrow,
particularly in respect to use of mortgage bonds and stocks as a
financing medium. Profitability is of course primarily a reflection of
volume of business in conjunction with rates and fares on the one
hand, and amounts of labor, fuel, materials, and supplies together
with their prices on the other. During the period under considera-
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tion these inputs into the railroad business took about 70 per cent of
operating revenue in the nonwar years. Interest is another item
relevant to profitability. In the 1920's interest paid out amounted
to about 9 per cent of revenues; it grew to 14 per cent in 1933, fell
back to 9 per cent by 1936, and after 1948 varied from 4 to 5 per
cent. What isleft to be divided between reinvestment in the
property, payment of dividends, and retirement of debt isalso
affected by taxes that earlier took about 6 per cent and after the
war about 10 per cent of revenue.4 Other smaller items are services
purchased, rents, and claims for loss, damage, and injuries. All these
items affect profits and therefore affect capital expenditures. Finally,
availability of funds for capital expenditure is affected by cash
requirements for retirement of debt.
In addition to influence on financial results, expected volume of
business affects the amount of capital goods that is seen as necessary
to provide transportation service. That is, if at a given point the
number of freight cars may not be quite enough to handle existing
demands for service and if expectations are that the level of demand
will be maintained, there will be pressure to buy more cars. Volume
also has its effect on acquisition of capital goods because it enters
into the calculation of both the economies from new technical im-
provements and the effects of variations in labor and materials
prJces. A new mechanism—for instance, the car• retarder for saving
brakeman's wages in large yard operation—may have looked like a
very desirable investment at 1928 levels of business, but quite un-
justified at 1932 levels. Thus, volume of business can operate in
both direct and indirect ways to vary the forces leading to invest-
ment in capital goods.
A historical review of the fluctuations of the more important of
these factors affecting profitability in relation to changes in the
rate of capital expenditure may indicate some of the causes of that
rate's irregularity. As the previous section emphasized, the placing
of orders is the critical point in deciding the timing and magnitude
of capital expenditure, so this review will deal with variations in
orders. It has also been indicated that authorizations and orders tend
to be concentrated in relatively few months just before and after
the end of the calendar year. Thus it is necessary that monthly order
data, rather than just those for the calendar year, be available for
analysis. Furthermore, if the effect of particular major rate and
'ibid.,1930, tables XII,xiv; 1949,tables 108, 111, by calculation.
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wage decisions that produce lump changes at specific times is to
be examined, the same frequent data are needed. Equipment orders
are the only capital expenditure items for which monthly data are
available over a long period. Of these, freight car orders to builder
seem the simplest to discuss because innovation and its timing have
less influence on them than on orders for locomotives or passenger
cars. Obviously, special considerations that apply to a particular
capital item lessen its usefulness for such a review as this, but
must be noted that car expenditures are the largest single item in
all the years of major turning points except 1933. Car orders are
notorious for being particularly sensitive to changes in influencing
factors and so have some special advantage for the purposes of this
review. On the other hand, car orders, like all equipment orders, are
more dependent than roadway orders on the amount of capital stock
or inventory existing at any given time relative to the volume of
business, as will be pointed out later. Thus, freight-car orders will
form the background of this analysis of the major turning points in
railroad capital expenditure.5
THE IN 1920
The year of the first turning point to be considered, 1920, was noted
for the number of critical happenings that might have influenced
the decisions of railroad companies. At the end of February, Cdn-
gress passed the Transportation Act of 1920, generally considered
to be the first constructive federal legislation concerning the rail-
roads. On March 1 the railroads were returned from government
control to private hands. The Labor Board on July 20 awarded a
21 per cent increase in wages retroactive to May 1. Railroad material
prices reached peaks during the middle months of the year and
softened thereafter. At the end of July a rate increase averaging
Monthly car order data are available in terms of orders to car-building com-
panies from 1920 to date in American Railway Car Institute, Car Building and
Car Repairs, 1950, P. 80. The other data for the following analysis are to be
found in the Annual Statistical Issues and other issues of Railway Age; ICC,
op.cit. and Statement M125, Selected Income and Balance Sheet Items; Associa-
tion of American Railroads, Bureau of Railway Economics, A Review of Rail-
road Operations; ARCI, op.cit. There are some types of differences between the
various data that should be noted. Orders close to the end or beginning of a
month are not always allocated to the same month. One series includes just
orders of railroads, another is for all orders to car builders and excludes orders
for cars to be built in carrier shops. The latter is available for the longest period
and will therefore be used.
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about 33 per cent was announced, to be effective August 26. For the
first eight months freight traffic was from 11 to 16 per cent above
the previous year, excluding strike periods. September marked a
downturn.
In terms of profitability, the result of all these factors was to give
a slight net railway operating income (this will hereinafter be
abbreviated as n.r.o.i., and is what remains from operating revenue
after deducting expenses, taxes, and equipment and joint facility
rentals) for the first three months, a deficit for the next five, and a
substantial positive amount for the last four. The year's total wound
up a mere $17 million for Class I companies. This was a period of
difficult readjustment after the war, against which the companies
were partly protected for six months following the return to private
operation by the government guarantee of income, the amounts for
which are not included in the above figure.
There was a serious car shortage through 1920, which reached a
peak in September. This receded rapidly thereafter, and a surplus
of 200,000 cars was recorded for the end of the year. Freight-car
prices reached a peak early in 1920, some three times what they
had been in prewar years. Toward the end of the year these prices
appeared to be softer. Railroad orders for cars started at 6,000 for
January, reached a peak in March at almost 20,000 cars, and dropped
to a range of 4,000 to 6,000 from May through the summer and
down to between 2,000 and 3,000 in the last three months, which
would normally be the beginning of the next season for orders.
There was no complete 1919/1920 season under private control. The
last four months of the season produced orders for 48,000 cars. The
1920/1921 season's orders were but 15,000.
The high level of traffic, the increasing shortages, and the relief
on return to private control appear to be the factors leading to the
March 1920 peak. The appearance of n.r.o.i. deficits thereafter, in
spite of continued high level of traffic, led to a reduction in orders
even though shortages were mounting. July brought kiiowledge of
wage increases accompanied by even greater rate increases, along
with softening material prices. Car orders did not increase. In the
last months of the year, when orders normally are high, the drop in
traffic, reduction in shortages, and falling car prices seemed to out-
weigh the improved trend in earnings, and orders declined still
further.
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THE UPTURN IN 1921
The turning point in the latter part of 1921 comes next for attention.
Material prices fell sharply in the first half of 1921, generally reach-
ing low points in September. A decision of the Labor Board on
June 1 reduced wages roughly 11 per cent, effective July 1. Changes
in working conditions also lowered labor costs. In the first half of
the year no major rate changes occurred. Traffic started the year
some 14 per cent below 1920 levels, the maximum percentage drop
below 1920 coming in August with carloadings 16 per cent and ton-
miles 29 per cent lower. This represented the greatest decline in
business thus far known to the railroads. N.r.o.i. was negative in the
first two months of 1921, but was gradually built up through better
discipline and lower costs, in spite of the decreased traffic, and from
July through October earnings were between 4.5 and 5 per cent of
the allowed valuation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), Car prices seemed still to be declining. In the meantime,
large car surpluses, as high as 500,000 in April, were accumulated.
These two factors seem to explain why practically no cars were
ordered from January to September.
In the month of October 1921, weekly carloading figures turned
upward and by the end of October almost reached 1920 levels. The
car surplus fell below 100,000. Prices appeared to be leveling off.
Cars could be had for roughly a third less than in early 1920. A rate
reduction on western grain of one-half the last increase came on
November 20, presaging further reductions. The signs of increasing
traffic, the decline in car surplus, the favorable nature of the latest
monthly earning reports, and the expectation of better car prices
would seem to have counterbalanced the negative effect of the rate
decrease, and October car orders reached nearly 8,000. December
orders exceeded this somewhat, January's were about 15,000, and
in March and April orders were between 22,000 and 24,000. The
season's total was just over 90,000. Ordering was sustained through
the summer. The factors favoring these large orders were strength-
ening of car prices after February; greater traffic, except in coal,
than for any previous year; reappearance of car shortages after May;
and improved n.r.o.i.
THE DOWNTURN 1929
The next major turn was in 1929. There were no important changes
in prices, wages, or rates in that year. Traffic relative to 1928 had
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increased slowly during the year, so that by the summer of 1929 car-
loadings were 4 to 6 per cent higher than in 1928. Beginning in the
first week of September, loadings fell off; by the first week in Octo-
ber they fell below those of 1928 and by the end of November
reached 7 per cent less. N.r.o.i. for the year as a whole was the
greatest of any year in the 1920's, though in the latter months it had
fallen below the 1928 monthly levels. Freight-car surplus during
the summer and in September was less than in 1928, but always
above 100,000. The end of October provided a serious psychological
shock in the form of the stock market crash. To counteract this,
President Hoover on November 19 at a special meeting at the White
House asked the railroad companies to maintain capital expenditures
and received their pledge to do so. While stock prices had been
seriously affected by the turn of late October, bonds held relatively
firm, and railroad borrowing remained possible through 1930. Car
orders had been high in September 1929—some 16,000; they fell to
the 8,000 level for the following two months and to 4,000 for Decem-
ber. January orders of 15,000 appeared to be in response to the
presidential exhortation, but only 5,000 were ordered in March and
1,000 in April, and orders for the remaining months of 1930 were a
mere trickle. Actually, the 1929/1930 ordering season,ifit be
extended to include September 1929, produced about the same num-
ber of orders as that of 1928/1929, some 56,000.
THE UPTURN OF 1933
The review of the turn of 1933 may best be introduced by noting
that railway wage rates were reduced 10 per cent on January 31,
1932, and, as. of December 1932, this level was extended for ten
more months. Materials continued their downward trend through
1932 and until May 1933. Rates gradually worked their way lower
because of competitive cuts. A surcharge of about 2.5 per cent on
rates was imposed from January 1932 to October 1933. Traffic in
1932 continued to decline through July, relative to 1931. Thereafter
the difference began to decrease. N.r.o.i. for 1932 reached a low of
only 26 per cent of that of 1929, and stayed at a low rate for the
first four months of 1933. Car orders to builders for the 1932/1933
season were a mere 50. The second week in May 1933 was the first
time in years when weekly carloadings exceeded those of the corre-
sponding week of the previous year. By the last week in June, they
were 20 per cent over 1932. N.r.o.i. began to recover, but large
amounts of unused capacity remained. The car surplus for 1933
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averaged over 500,000, though this was some 100,000 less than for
1932. By the fall of 1933, with the opening of the 1938/1934 car
order season, carloadings dropped relative to 1932. In October 1933
they were only 4 per cent greater than in 1932, and in December the
same. For January 1934, loadings were actually less than for Janu-
ary 1932, but each successive month thereafter through July they
gained again. For the first four months of 1934 n.r.o.i. was almost
triple what it had been in 1933. Orders to car builders for the
1933/1934 season did not appear until February and March 1934,
then totaling only 14,000. With the near impossibility of company
borrowing, the government credit arrangements or help under the
Public Works Administration (PWA), initiated in late 1933 and
effective for the railroads in 1934, made possible these few orders.
The latter half of 1984 found the railroads with a 2.8 per cent wage-
rate increase, material price increases of some 20 per cent over mid-
1933, carloadings generally less than in 1933, and n.r.o.i. 25 per cent
below 1933. Not until March 1935 did the ICC decide to allow a
rate increase, which amounted to about 8 per cent. Almost simul-
taneously wage rates rose 8 per cent. The average car surplus for
1934 was 360,000. Practically no cars were ordered in the 1984/1935
season.
THE DOWNTURN OF 1987
The turning point of May 1937 comes next. During the previous
year, 1936, wage and freight rates remained level, and material
prices turned up in midyear. After March 1936, carloading moved
steadily ahead of the 1934 and 1935 levels, by August being 20 per
cent higher. N.r.o.i. for the second quarter of 1986 was 24 per cent
above the previous year; for the third quarter, 56 per cent; and for
the last quarter, 32 per cent. Freight-car surplus, which had started
the year at 250,000, by the fall peak was only 110,000, and at the
end of the year was 125,000. There had been an unusual nonseasonal
bulge in car orders centering on May 1936, totaling 23,000 for the
four midyear months. After negligible orders for August through
October 1936, the orders to builders rose to 15,000 for December.
The elimination of emergency freight charges was announced by the
ICC on December 19, 1936. This meant the loss of $112 million in
revenue at 1936 traffic levels. Car orders continued at the 15,000
level in January 1937, dropped in February and March, and jumped
to 6,000 in April. The 1936/1937 season's railroad orders to builders
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totaled some 52,000, almost up to the annual average of the last
four years of the 1920's.
The year 1937 started with a continuing increase in material
prices, wage rates the same as 1936, and lower freight rates. Payroll
taxes in connection with retirement and unemployment were added
in 1937 to the extent of $92 million. The unions in February voted
to demand wage increases, and the railroads at the turn of the year
started proceedings before the ICC for higher rates. Carloadings
continued their gains over previous years. In April and May 1937
they averaged 15 per cent above the same months in 1936. N.r.o.i.
for the first quarter was 38 per cent higher than in 1936. However,
beginning with June, carloadings failed to maintain their gains over
1936. Later it became apparent that n.r.o.i. in May was off. June's
was better, but July's was even below 1936. Carloadings relative to
1936 continued to decline in July and August. Material prices con-
tinued to rise. Through August and October wage rates were in-
creased by 5 to 5.5centsan hour. On October 19 the ICC granted
the first of a series of commodity rate increases calculated to provide
$69 million in additional revenue. By August n.r.o.i. was 23 per cent
below 1936. Then October saw the beginning of the most rapid
drop of traffic known in railroad records, and by the last two weeks
of December carloadings were almost at their 1932 level. The year
1937 ended with a car surplus of 280,000. On November 9 the rail-
roads asked for still further rate increases, which were granted on
March 8, 1938 and were of a magnitude to provide $175 million in
revenue at 1936 traffic levels. N.r.o.i. continued to fall from Septem-
ber till it reached a negative amount in February 1938.
Monthly data for railroad cash deposits were available for the
first time in this downturn and are of considerable interest. These
had increased with the volume of business through 1935 and 1936,
being $210 million on December 31, 1936, or 57 per cent more than
on the same date in 1934. In 1937 they continued through March
an upward trend relative to 1936. During the next four months the
rate of increase declined and by August deposits were the same as
in 1936. By the end of September they were $55 million less, for
October $92 million, and by the end of the year $197 million. In
March 1938 the maximum decline over the corresponding month of
the previous year was reached, at $208 million. Near cash items had
declined but slightly during this period. Loans and bills payable,
representing short-term borrowing, did not change in 1937 and rose
but $25 million during January, February, and March 1938. The
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tremendous pressure to maintain a cash position by not making any
capital expenditure commitments is obvious from these figures.
The 1987/1988 season produced but 660 car orders. In the last
part of 1937 high wages and material prices, followed by a precipi-
tate drop in business, nullified any effect rate increases had on
earnings. Financial adversity, declining business, and mounting car
surpluses were a complete deterrent to ordering.
THE UPTURNOF1938
The 1938 general upturn in economic activity is dated in June in
the NBER business cycle chronology. For the railroads, that year
began with a general rate increase of about 5 per cent. It was hoped
that a wage-rate reduction could be obtained, but none was forth-
coming. Prices of railroad material declined some 5 per cent during
the year. Carloadings fell off during the first part of the year and
were below 1932 levels into May. N.r.o.i., a negative amount in
February, staggered along through June at levels lower than in any
year of the decade. With an upward tendency in carloadings,
second-half n.r,o.i. was $13 million more than that for 1937. It was
the same as for 1935, not as much as for 1933. Minimum car surplus
was 139,000. In the first quarter of 1939 there were no rate, wage,
or price changes, and carloadings improved slightly, though they
were still only at 1934 and 1935 levels. The quarter's n.r.o.i. of $85
million was up to the 1935 level but less than that for 1934. Car
orders for the 1938/1939 season totaled but 11,000.
THE DOWNTURN OF 1948
Because of the abnormal factors, the war years have been skipped
in this discussion. The next and last turning point to be considered
affected capital decisions of the winter of 1948-1949. 1n 1948 there
were increases in rates, wages, and material prices. Rates were raised
generally in January, May, and again in August, totaling 14 per cent
above 1947 levels. A decision handed down at the end of December
gave a further increase of some 5 per cent to be effective in the
middle of January. On October 1, 1948, operating wages were in-
creased 10 cents an hour and nonoperating 7 cents, with provisions
to be effective in September 1949 for putting the latter group on a
forty-hour week at no decrease in weekly wages. Railroad material
prices pushed upward some 14 per cent through the first nine
months of 1948. Carloadings in the first part of the year were below
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1947, but for May and June they were the same. A minor decline
occurred in the latter part of the year. N.r.o.i. reached new postwar
highs beginning in May, and from June through October each month
produced over $100 million. By December the carloading decline
took on more serious proportions, and n.r.o.i. fell below the previous
December's level. For the year it totaled $1,002,000,000, the best non-
war year figure since 1929. Car shortages had been serious following
the war and continued through 1948, the maximum in the fall peak
of 1948 being 22,000, about a half of what it had been in the previous
year.
The 1947/1948 car order season accounted for some 50,000 orders,
the 1948/1949 for but 11,000, practically all of which came before
the turn of the calendar year. Continued decline in carloading
through 1949 more than offset two rate increases for the year, and
by the third quarter of 1949 n.r.o.i. was but a little over one half
of what it had been in 1948. Car orders through the mid-1949 off-
season months and the 1949 part of the 1949/1950 order season
were under 8,000. At the end of 1948 there had been 64,808 freight
cars on order from the builders, while at the end of 1949 there were
but 3,760. Decrease in traffic, reduction in shortages, and lowered
n.r.o.i. more than made up for the series of rate increases in the
balance of the types of factors under discussion.
This terse review of major factors influencing profitability at seven
turning points indicates the complex interrelation of the factors as
they affect decision making. Favorable general changes in rate
level cannot be earmarked as a factor necessarily leading to ex-
panded capital expenditure, since decreases in traffic can over-
balance them, as in 1920, 1938, and 1949. The immediate effect of
wage increases, if rates and traffic together do not supply corre-
sponding added revenue, can be strongly negative by adversely
affecting n.r.o.i. Substantial increases in traffic with a corresponding
increase in n,r.o.i., if other things remain equal, can have a buoyant
effect as in 1936-1937. Expectations about the price of capital items
can, in an extreme situation such as that in 1920, be important. In
the item under review, as will be brought out later, the inventory of
capital units has an influence in relation to level of traffic. One has
the feeling that major changes in traffic volume, with their double
influence on need for cars and on n.r.o.i., tend to dominate if the
other factors change in only minor ways.
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The Effect of Innovation on Investment
Technical advances are another factor leading to investment. Two
principal questions arise in connection with innovations, one being
whether their timing has any relation to phases of economic fluctua-
tion, the other being whether they can have sufficient influence of a
positive sort to override other factors that might time investment
demand. It must be recognized at the outset that there are on the
one hand the large-scale innovations, some of which are drastic and
universal in their impact, such as the diesel electric locomotive;
while others are more restricted and less immediately compelling,
such as electrification. Then there are innumerable smaller-scale
advances, such as improved types of air brakes, better truck frames,
mechanical track-maintenance tools, on down to items scarcely
recognized as capital, such as tie plates. There is obviously room
for detailed analyses of no more than a small sample of these types.
A historical analysis of innovation should begin with the observa-
tion that in the early l900's the possible influence of innovations
was overpowered by the great demand for increased capacity. For
instance, while new locomotive types were developed and acquired
in the early 1900's to increase tonnage of trains and to keep costs
down in spite of increasing wage rates, the major pressure was to
get enough added hauling capacity to take care of developing in-
creases in business. Not until after the middle of the 1920's can
innovation generally be seen to stand out alone as a cause for addi-
tional investment to effect economies or to provide improved service.
An illustration of this type is the previously mentioned car retarder,
which was first introduced in the United States in 1925. Similar in
their effect were the several new types of freight steam locomotives
brought into wide use about the same time. The streamlined light-
weight passenger car, the passenger road diesel, and air conditioning
of a later date furnish examples more obvious to the general public.
Clearly, the impact of all these innovations on investment is influ-
enced to a substantial degree by economic factors, notably changes
in wage rates and in fuel and material prices, and extent of competi-
tive pressure. The steady and almost continuous rise in engine- and
train-crew wages from the early 1900's to date has been an active
force toward the development and adoption of improvements that
would increase train loads. The relatively greater increase over the
last decade in the wages of maintenance-of-way, yard, and station
employees compared with the wages of train employees has led to
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emphasis on the labor-saving qualities of work and office mechanical
equipment. Certainly, the active competition for long-haul passen-
ger business gave added push to the investment in lightweight,
streamlined passenger cars and new types of locomotives with which
to haul them.
The first question, whether innovation timing is related to any
particular phase of business fluctuation, raises some difficult prob-
lems of interpretation. The beginning of the first or experimental
stage of an innovation, where and when the original idea or concept
appeared, or even what it actually was, is difficult if not impossible
to ascertain. The second or developmental stage may be said to start
with the experimental model and run through refinement and
change leading to a final unit capable of regular operation and
ready to be made commercially available. This stage usually is
accompanied by some evidence publicly available, and the terminal
date is by definition ascertainable. The third phase may be identified
as that involving the general adoption of the innovation by many
individual companies, accompanied by further refinements and
modifications.
The difficulty of identifying what has been designated as the first
stage of an innovation is indicated by some of the steps that led to
the road diesel-electric locomotive. A substantial number of years
before the construction of a diesel-electric locomotive, the electric-
traction motors, electric control, truck, and frame elements neces-
sary for such a locomotive were worked out in conjunction with
designs for electric locomotives, gas- and electric-rail cars, and street
and rapid-transit electric cars. Likewise, the diesel engine itself had
been manufactured for various other uses by a number of companies
both in the United States and Europe for a number of years before
the appearance of the diesel-electric locomotive. Diesel engines
were applied to rail cars in 1928.8 In one of the lines of development
of the diesel-electric locomotive, by the Electro Motive Company,
the origins were to be found in its manufacture of gas-rail cars. The
transition to the locomotive was by substitution of a diesel for a gas
engine and enlargement of the motive-power element to a point
where the power car no longer could carry passengers or head-end
traffic. Another line of development brought together the know-how
of the Ingersoll-Rand and Mclntosh-Seymor companies as diesel
6RailwayAge, vol. 86, January 5, 1929, p. 110.
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engine manufacturers with that of the American Locomotive and
General Electric companies as electric locomotive builders. Initially,
this combination worked toward a switch engine, but by 1928 it pro-
duced a test road locomotive. In neither line was any substantial
investment in new plant necessary for construction of initial units
because plant used for building preceding types of equipment could
be adapted. At just what point in this whole history the road diesel
locomotive idea can be said to have first jelled is certainly not clear,
and not the least problem is the definition of the unit.
As far as the time span and timing of the second stage of an
innovation is concerned, the tabulation of dates in table 1, relating
to major innovations since 1920 in the railroad field, provides an
opportunity for exploring their relationship to phases of business
fluctuation. The earlier date shown is that of the completion of the
first actually operable unit incorporating the basic features of what
came to be the generally adopted unit. This leaves unidentified
earlier experimentation with respect to separate aspects of the final
type and to applications in other fields. The second date is that
when manufacturing companies had produced the first type of unit
that they were ready to make and sell on demand.
The number of these major innovations since 1920 provides such
a small sample that it makes definitive conclusions impossible. How-
ever, it may be noted that the generally prosperous period between
mid-1922 and the latter part of 1929 saw the commercial offering
of half of the innovations. The poor times of 1931 to 1935, inclusive,
accounted for four out of the ten. In terms of the National Bureau
of Economic Research reference cycle chronology, four of the offer-
ings came in the mid-1924---mid-1926 expansion, two in that of 1933—
mid-1937, and one in the following expansion. One offering came
in the 1926-1927 contraction and two in that of 1929-1932.
If one views the tortuous course taken in the development of some
of these innovations, it is small wonder that there seems to be little
more than chance occurrence in timing. To take still another example
for sake of emphasis, the AB freight brake history could be said to
go as far back as an ICC investigation and report in 1924 concerning
alleged inadequacies of freight brakes. Existing brakes were subject
to stationary test-plant trials in 1926. New types of equipment were
supplied for test in 1927 and 1928, and second designs in 1928 and
1929. Road tests were made on the latter in 1929 and 1930. A third
refinement of design to meet serious deficiencies appearing in the
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TABLE 1




model in U.S. or offering
Innovation (1) (2)
a.Four-wheel trailing trucks and large
box for steam locomotive
fire
1919 1925
b.Diesel-electric switcher 1924 1925
c.Diesel-electric road locomotive forpas-
senger trains 1928 1935









senger cars 1932 1933
g.AB freight air brake 1927 1932
h.Air conditioning 1929 1981
i.Car retarders 1923 1925
j.Centalized traffic control ? 1927
Sources:
InnovationColumn
a 1 Locomotive Cyclopedia, 10th edn., 1938, p. 103.
2 Railway Age, vol. 78, May 2, 1925, p. 1077.
b 1 ibid., vol. 78, January 3, 1925, p. 41.
2 ibid., vol. 80, January 2, 1926, p. 72.
c 1 ibid., vol. 86, January 5, 1929, P. 86.
2 ibid., vol. 98, January 26, 1935, p. 181, insert.
d 1 ibid., vol. 79, October 10, 1925, p. 645.
2 ibid., vol. 110, February 8, 1941,p. 287.
e 2 ibid., vol. 80, January 2, 1926, advertisements.
f 1 ibid., vol. 94, February 4, 1933, p. 94; vol. 96, January
27, 1934, p. 166.
2 ibid., vol. 94, February 4, 1933,p. 94; vol. 96, January
27, 1934, P. 166.
g 1 American Railway Association, Division V, Power Brakes
and Appliances, 1932, p. 5.
2 Railway Mechanical Engineer, vol. 107, March 1938,
p. 75.
h 1 ibid., vol. 104, September 1930,p. 508.
2 Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Report of Me-
chanical Advisory Committee, 1935, p. 638.
i 1 Railway Age, vol. 77, November 15, 1924,P. 895.
2 ibid., vol. 78, May 9, 1925, p. 1145.
2 ibid., vol. 83, July 16, 1927,p. 13; August 6, 1927,
p. 276; August 20, 1927, p. 325.
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road tests was developed in 1930 and tested in The manu-
facturers made the commercial offering of the final model in 1932.
In 1983 this was adopted by the railroads for compulsory installa-
tion on all new cars, and in 1934 a ten-year reconversion program
for old cars was agreed upon.8
In the third phase of innovation, the using companies make capital
expenditure on the new items. The annual rates of installation
provide the index of the influence of the innovations on capital
expenditure. It appears at once that there is considerable lag be-
tween the date of first commercial offering and the beginning of
high rates of expenditure. Since most of the innovations so far con-
sidered have not run their full course of installation and obsolescence
it is necessary to go back in railroad history to earlier innovations
to get some idea of the timing over the whole cycle of expenditure.
A typical case is that involving the mikado locomotive, a new type
first ordered for this country in 1902 and destined to have sufficiently
wide use to provide significant data. The mikado, as defined for this
analysis, was an eight-driving-wheel freight locomotive with a
larger firebox and greater heating surface than had been provided
previously, made possible by adding two nondriving trailing wheels
to the locomotive wheel arrangement. The combination of two addi-
tional trailing wheels and larger fireboxes and heating surfaces was
introduced at about the same time on passenger locomotives with
the same objective of increasing power. The extra trailing wheels
alone had been introduced a decade earlier. In this instance, the
innovation appeared when there was a great demand for added
hauling capacity because the railroads were being offered increased
traffic, a situation that stands in contrast to the circumstances under
which some of the more recent innovations have been offered. For
a sample of forty major Class I companies, annual orders for the
mikado during the twenty-seven years that covered its complete life
cycle are estimated in Table 2, along with the year of individual
company adoption.
Within the twenty-seven-year cycle for the mikado, the first eight
years represented a period of adoption by the few railroads where
engineers, well known as leaders with new ideas, headed the
7 American Railway Association, Division V, Power Brakes and Appliances,
1932. (In 1934 the American Railway Association became the Association of
American Railroads.)
8 Railway Age, vol. 96, April 21, 1934,p. 579; vol. 97, November 24, 1934,
p. 656.
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TABLE 2
ADOPTION OF THE MIKADO TYPE LocoMoTIvE BY FORTY MAJoR U.S. RAILROADS
Total Cumu-
locomotivesMikados lative
ordered byordered total ofRailroad companies
all U.S. by forty-Railroad companies of samplecompanies placing last
railroads andcompany first ordering inikados adopting orders for
industrialssample in years mikados,nikados in year'
V, CMStP&P
1902 4,665 15 AT&SF 1
1903 3,283 — 1
1904 2,538 25 NP 2
1905 6,265 90 LV 3
1906 5,642 125 3
1907 3,482 15 3
1908 1,182. 32 5
1909 3,350 67 — 5
1910 3,787 73 CB&Q 6
1911 2,850 370"P, W, E, B&O, C&O, S,
ACL, MP, IC, GN, UP
17
1912 4,5151,172 R, DL&W, NYC, MKT,
CNW, D&RGW, CRI&P
24
1913 3,467 482 B&A, SP, C&NW 26
1914 1,265 339 L&N, NC&StL, SAL 29
1915 1,612 439. NH,CGW 31
1916 2,910 630 NYC&StL 32







CofNJ, TP, WP 35
35
1920 1,998 166 35
1921 239 29 35









































Railroad companies in sample never ordering mikados: B&M, NW, StLSW.
b Breaking point.
CFederalcontrol occurred in this year. Figure includes locomotives for other
than the forty sample companies.
Source: Railway Age, Annual Statistical Numbers, 1903-1931. Does not in-
clude rebuilt units. Railway Age suggests that there may be some inaccuracies
in the figures, though not sufficient to invalidate their general import. This com-
ment should be taken to apply to subsequent use of these order data.mechanical departments or probably were important in the technical
aspects of decision making.9 Then in the tenth and eleventh years,
the first being a depressed year for orders in general, the great mass
of firms "caught on," eighteen out of the forty in the sample. In pass-
ing, it might be noted that even as early as the tenth year new alter-
native designs began to make slight inroads on the supremacy of the
mikado type, though, all told, it remained a "best seller" for thirteen
years. At the end of that time two new types, the mountain locomo-
tive and the eight-driver four-wheel trailing-truck arrangement,
took over.
The history of adoption of most of the new types of steam loco-
motives introduced from 1900 to 1915 indicates a similar period of
lag between first orders for a type and the beginning of heavy
capital expenditures for it. Table S presents the available data. The
prairie type took hold most rapidly, largely because it was the
Such men were Player, of the AT&SF; McHenry, of the NP and later the
NH; Barr, of the CMStP; Delano, of the CBQ; and Marshall, of the LSMS
(NYC). Railroad Gazette, vol. 31, p. 442; vol. 32, pp. 181, 195, 839; vol. 33,
pp. 598, 800, 872.
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Chart 1
Annual Orders for Mikado Type Locomotives
40 Major U. S. Railroads
Number of units ordered
0
'04'06'08'10'12'14'16'1$'20'22'24'26'28'30
Source:Table 2.CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN RAILROADS
locomotive that was built to increase the capacity of midwestern
roads hard-pressed to keep up with rapidly increasing demands of
the first decade of the century. The Santa Fe type was the slowest to
gain acceptance, thirteen years elapsing before annual orders ex-
ceeded 100.
TABLE 3








Year of first order 1902 1903 1902 1900 1901 1911
Additions, U.S.:
1902-1903 32 221 35
1903-1904 0 38 148
1904-1905 88 86 1 164 119
1905-1906 56 54 — 78 216
1906-1907 90 21 28 550 186
1907-1908 10 — 65 194 149
1908-1909 7 — — 131 280
1909-1910 81 1 108 139 408a
1910-1911 304a 235 4 715 2
1911-1912 488 — 99 — '
1912-1913 1,254 32 188 — 653 —
1913-1914 824 — 58 — 520 22
Orders, North American
railroads:
1913 796 — 72 — 566 24
1914 833 63 59 — 174 12
1915 562 75 120 — 102 9
1916 758 218 — 278 15
1917 834 370 175 — 342 —
Orders, U.S. railroads:
1918 915 269 145 — 79 50
a Breakingpoint.
Sources: Additions from Interstate Commerce Commission, Staii&tics of Rail-
ways in the U.s., 1902-1914, table entitled "Detailed Classification of Loco-
motives," by calculation; orders from Railway Mechanical Engineer, vol. 91,
January 1917, p. 8; vol. 92, January 1918, p. 59.
Another type of early innovation that may be used by way of
further illustration is the continuous-track-circuit automatic block
signal system. This had its origins as far back as 1872, with the
invention of the track circuit. The next thfrty-odd years saw the
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initial development of numerous types of accompanying signal
mechanisms. The first continuous installation over a considerable
length of line was started in 1890 on the Boston and Albany from
Boston to Springfield. Roughly ten years later, the Pennsylvania had
finished its installation from Jersey City to Philadelphia, and the
Lehigh Valley had equipped its main line from Jersey City to
Buffalo.'0 But by the end of 1900 there were only 2,000-odd miles
of line with automatic signals." Ten thousand miles had been in-
stalled by 1908, 20,000 by 1912, 40,000 by 1928, 60,000 by 1930, and
by 1950, 76,000. Though the data prior to 1908 were not gathered
on a consistent basis, it would appear that the first year in which
anything approaching 1,000 miles of line was equipped came in
1901; 1908 accounted for almost 1,200; 1904 for something over 700.12
The subsequent annual additions are indicated in table 4.
TABLE 4
INSTALLATIONOF TIIACK EQUIPPED WITH AUTOMATIC BLOCK SIGNAL
Year Net miles Year Net miles Year Net miles
1905 1,300 1920 575 1935 25
1906 1,700 1921 518 1936 289
1907 4,000a 1922 1,004 1937 80
1908 1,388 1923 1,471 1938 465
1909 2,047 1924 2,302 1939 593
1910 3,474 1925 1,758 1940 436
1911 2,623 1926 3,868 1941 739
1912 1,884 1927 4,151 1942 864
1913 4,350 1928 2,872 1943 333
1914 3,298 1929 3,673 1944 603
1915 1,079 1930 2,564 1945 1,745
1916 2,012 1931 805 1946 1,620
1917 2,238 1932 — 1947 2,115
1918 1,796 1933 — 1948 1,186
1919 980 1934 — 1949 1,589 -
a Breakingpoint.
Sources: For years prior to 1912, Railway Age, vol. 72, January 7, 1933, p.
138; for 1912-1949, Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Safety, Annual
Reports.
After the first workable system was installed on the Boston and
Albany about fifteen years elapsed before large-scale investment in
automatic block signals was begun, in 1907, by the railroads of the
United States. This innovation continued to be the basis for sub-
10 ibid., vol. 22, p. 324; vol. 33, pp. 227, 449. 11 ibid., vol. 33, p.
12 ibid., vol. 34,p. 88; vol. 35, p. 148; vol. 38, p. 80.
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stantial further capital investment for the forty-five years to date,
the depression of the 1930's and its aftermath excepted. As many
new miles were equipped in the five-year period 1925-1929 as in the
great spurt of adoption fifteen years earlier, in 1910-1914.
The history of company adoptions of signaling indicates that a
few companies took hold initially at various stages of development
and that some others, without markedly different characteristics,
waited several decades before seing fit to make use of the innovation.
The causes for the lasting drawing power of this innovation lie
in continually increasing emphasis on safety, higher speeds, and
heavier trains, and rising unit wage rates for the operators of train-
order and manual block systems, together with continued refine-
ments of the equipment. The reasons why complete installations or
universal adoption did not come about immediately lay in uncer-
tainty as to just which was the best type and how many improve-
ments would be forthcoming, commitment to earlier manual block
systems, lack of conviction on the part of some managements that
there were sufficient advantages to justify the expenditure, and lack
of financial resources on the part of weaker companies. The in-
stallations up to about 1902 were made on sufficiently varying types
of lines to indicate that, for managements that were favorably in-
clined, there was equipment available that might have warranted
installation on the main lines of all companies.
The all-steel passenger train car was another innovation of the
early twentieth century. It had its origins in steel underframe cars,
the first steam railroad use of which appears to have come in 1893,
and in rapid-transit type all-steel cars, of which 300 were built for the
New York subways in 1904. Sample all-steel cars of heavy steam-
railroad design were forthcoming from 1.904 through 1906. The
New York Central placed the first quantity orders for this type in
1906 in connection with its suburban electrification. Total construc-
tion remained at the level of several hundred a year through 1909,
when 26 per cent, or just under 500, of the 1,880 cars acquired were
all In 1910 some 2,000 all-steel cars were built, and in the
three following years some 2,200, 2,100, and 1,800 respectively. In
the last year, 1913, the all-steel cars represented 69 per cent of the
total.
A final early example of the length and variation in investment
effects of innovation is provided by the air brake. This case differs
Railway Review, vol. 54, June 6, 1914, p. 822, by calculation.
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from the previous cases in that there was strong pressure for 100 per
cent adoption to obtain full advantage of the device's contributions.
In just its application to freight cars, again after a considerable
period of development with a maximum preliminary annual installa-
tion of 15,000 in 1884, a definitive type of train brake using com-
pressed air was offered to the market at the end of Some
28,000 of these units were supplied by the Westinghouse Airbrake
Company in 1888, and 24,000 in 1889. The report of this manufac-
turing firm of its installations as of January 1890 indicated that
three companies led in adoptions—the Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe; Southern Pacific; and Union Pacific—each having purchased
over 15,000 units. The Pennsylvania and Northern Pacific were in a
secOnd group, with some 8,000 apiece.15 Again there were a few
pioneering firms. In the middle of 1889, 52,000 of the 880,000 rail-
road-owned freight cars were equipped with some type of con-
tinuous air brake. Labor's interest in the safety features of these
brakes in contrast to hand braking led to the passage in 1893 of
federal legislation calling for complete adoption of air brakes by
1898. The history of the adoption is shown in table 5.
TABLE 5



















1889/1890 21 9 1900/1901 151 77
1890/1891 36 12 1901/1902 153 78
1891/1892 65a 18 1902/1903 147 82
1892/1893 37 20 1903/1904 82 85
1893/1894 28 22 1904/ 1905 81 88
1894/1895 30 25 1905/1906 174 92
1895/1896 84 31 1906/1907 213 96
1896/1897 75 37 1907/ 1908 142 97
1897/1898 114 46 1908/1909 — 98
1898/1899 163 57 1909/1910 68 99
1899/1900 190 67
a Breakingpoint.
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways in the U.S.,
1889-1910, table entitled "Freight Service Cars Equipped with Train Brakes."
The figures for the first four fiscal years are by calculation to include leased
and fast freight_line cars.
14 Railroad Gazette, voi. 22, p. 856. 15 ibid., vol. 22,p. 197.
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Along with the installation of the brakes, the inventory of all
freight service cars was increasing rapidly from 1,014,000 at mid-
1890 to 1,366,000 at mid-1900, and 2,135,000 at mid-1910. By 1900
there were as many cars equipped with the brake as there had been
cars in 1890. From 1900 on, more than half of the installations of
brakes represented those for new cars added to inventory. The rate
of equipping old cars was maintained above the 50,000 level until
1907/1908. Annual rates of installation were obviously sensitive to
the general level of economic activity. The astonishing part of it is
the length of time, twenty-three years, it took to achieve universal
application of an innovation with such compelling advantages and
with such a low capital expenditure relative to the total amounts
being spent by the railroads. The western roads were far ahead of
those of the rest of the country at the beginning, with 20 per cent
of their freight cars equipped against 4 per cent each for the South
and East in mid-1890. By mid-1900 the proportions were 73 per cent,
70 per cent, and 63 per cent respectively.16 The western roads had
been adding freight cars to their inventories faster prior to 1890.
Their longer grades may have made the continuous train brake a
more valuable piece of equipment to them, though the eastern and
southern roads were not without serious grade problems.
It is of interest to note that an improved type of freight brake, the
K model, was introduced in 1905, before universal equipment of
freight cars had been achieved. This model was to replace the type
used initially to equip the country's stock of cars.'7
Returning to the major innovations of the period particularly
under consideration, 1920 to date, the four-wheel trailing-truck type
of locomotive provides a more recent illustration of rates of adop-
tion. These locomotives for freight service were the immediate suc-
cessors to the mikado and its heavier running mate, the Santa Fe
type, and for passenger service were the successors to the Pacific
and mountain.
Through its increase of firebox capacity, the four-wheel trailing-
truck locomotive offered both higher sustained speeds and more
economical service for main-line trains than its predecessors. Within
five years a third of the companies in the sample had adopted this
type for freight service, but fifteen years elapsed before over half
the companies had. In passenger service, its potential use was much
16ICC,op.cit., 1890, 1900, tables entitled "Freight Cars in Service Equipped
with Train Brakes."
17RailroadGazette, vol. 40, p. 314.
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TABLE 6
ADOPTION OF FOUR-WREEL TRAILING-TRUCK STEAM (NON-MALLET)
FREIGHT AND PASSENGER LOCOMOTIVES BY FORT? MAJOR U.S. RAILROADS
FOUR-WHEEL TRAILING-TRUCK FOUR-WHEEL TRAILING-TRUCK
FREIGHT LOCOMOTIVES PASSENGER LOCOMOTIVES
(NON-MALLET) (NON-MALLET)
Locomotives Sample Cumulative Sample Cuinulative
ordered by companies total of companies total of
forty-sample first companiesUnits first companies
companiesordering in year using orderedordering in year using
1925 35 B&A,T&P 2 — — —
1926 70 IC 8 37AT&SF, NYC, 3
NYC&StL, NP
1927 104aB&M, E, C&NW, 7 64NYC, DL&W 5
CB&Q
1928 106 DL&W 8 53CRI&P, D&RG, 8
CN
1929 171 W, CRI&P, MP, 13 186aC&NW, CB&Q, 12
CGW,AT&SF CMStP&P, SP
1930 92LV, C&O, StLSW 16 47
1931 30 16 8
1932 — 16 —
1933 — — 16 10 —
1934 40 NYC&StL 17 5 LV 13
1935 — — 17 5 C&O 14
1936 98 CMStP&P, ICCS 19 127 NH 15
1937 19 84 ACL 16
1938 10 19 12 — 16
1939 19 15 UP 17
1940 — 19 46 NW, StLSF 19
1941 L&N, NC&StL 21 27b NC&StL 20
1942 172 P,SP, WP, NP, 26 4b 20
StLSF
1943 259 N&W, C&O, UP29 10 20
1944 11 NYC 80 5b 20
1945 73 V,R 32 13b 20
1946 40 — 82 — 20
1947 — 32 10 20
1948 82 82 — 20
1949 3 32 3 20
1950 32 20
aBreaking point.
b Joint freight-passenger locomotives.
Source: Railway Age, Annual Statistical Numbers, 1926-1951.
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more restricted and one half of the sample companies never used it.
The four-wheel trailing-truck type of locomotive had sufficiently
attractive advantages to create some demand during the middle
thirties, when practically all of the locomotives ordered were of
this type. Its second spurt came primarily for freight service to meet
the traffic demands of World War II, at a time when the diesel was
just beginning to be accepted.
The diesel-electric switcher carried the burden of introducing the
diesel idea. The history of switcher adoption conforms to the general
pattern of a long preliminary period of adoption by a few progres-
sive or specially situated companies before general acceptance
(table 7).
Many of the early orders for the diesel-electric switchers were
influenced by antismoke agreements or ordinances in New York
and on the lake front in Chicago that compelled electrification or
dieselization, but, all told, the orders did represent the usual pattern
of getting the feel of the new item, firm by firm. Not until 1935,
ten years after the first commercial availability, did the companies
generally begin to "take on" the diesel switcher. Then the acceptance
was sufficiently broad and incentive great enough to sustain the
level of orders during the 1937-1938 contraction and make the
diesel switcher the one innovation among the ten under considera-
tion able to stimulate depression-proof investment demand. By 1940
the level of orders had reached that for steam switchers in the peak
years of the 1920's. In some fifteen years the innovation reached
its stride in application.
In this instance the long phase of gradual adoption saw a signifi-
cant shift in relative prices of steam and diesel switchers, part of
the refinement process that tends to go on during this phase. In the
1920's and early 1980's diesel switchers of even the smaller horse-
powers cost around $100,000, while the larger steam switchers were
available for about $50,000. By 1936 and 1937 the smaller, 600-h.p.
diesel cost about $65,000, the larger, 1,000-h.p. diesel nearly $100,000,
and the large steam switcher $70,000. By 1948 the 1,000-h.p. diesel
switcher was still available for about $100,000, but the large steam
one had reached $110,000 to $120,000.18
The passenger diesel was built on the groundwork of the switcher,
but it still took ten years after the former was first offered for half
Railway Age, vol. 88, January 4, 1930, p. 75; vol. 90, January 3, 1931,
p. 104; vol. 92, January 2, 1932, p. 41; vol. 102, January 2, 1937, p. 44; vol.
104, January 1, 1988, p. 51; vol. 126, January 6, 1949, p. 123.
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TABLE 7
ADOPTION OF DIESEL-ELECTRIC
AND RoAD PASSENGER LocoMoTivEs
DIESEL-ELECTRIC SwITCHERSa
(CLASS I LINE HAUL AND DIESEL-ELECTRIC ROAD
TERMINAL RAILROAD COMPANIES) PASSENGER UNITS
Number Cumulative Units Cumulative
ordered total of orderedbCompanies in forty-total of
by all U.S.Companies firstcompaniesby all U.S.road sample firstcompanies
companiesordering in year using railroadsordering in year using
1924 1 NYC 1
1925 11 B&O, CofNJ, C&NW,7
DL&W, E, LV
1926 8 GN, R, LI 10
1927 5 — 10
1928 2 IC 11
1929 11 CMStP&P 12
1930 1 — 12
1931 5NH, CB&Q, BT 15
1932 15
1933 15 15
1934 21Bit of Chi, CWI, 18 3 B&O, AT&SF 2
CGW
1935 7 AT&SF, PPU 20 — — 2
1936 52 BLE, RI, BM, CGW, 26 18CB&Q, (C&NW, 4
MonC, BS UP, SP),c CRI&P
1937 93 EJE, MP, P 29 20 — 4
1938 110CEI, GTW, KCT,34 12 SAL, UP 6
M&StL, GB&W
1939 176 ACL, CofG, KCS, LN, 45 30FEC, ACL, MP, 11
PM, SF, TC, W, KCS, C&NW
WP, Sioux, MT
1940 255(Too many corn- 83 IC, GN, S 14
1941 583d panies to be listed) 65 NH, P, LN, 18
CMStP&P
1942 434 31 B&M 19
1943 434 96 19
1944 (Combined road and 131NYC, W, SILSF 22
1945 switcher models make 95 T&P, MKT 24
1946 figures no longer 245dDL&W, E, NP, 30
comparable) D&RG, WP, SP
1947 326LV, NYC&StL, 34
CGW, C&O
1948 211 NC&StL 35
1949 106 StLSW,R .37
1950 215 CofNJ 38
a Excluding electric locomotives with diesel auxiliary.
b A locomotive may consist of one to four units.
Joint-use equipment. Individual-use orders indicated later.
d Breaking point.
Source: Railway Age, Annual Statistical Numbers, 1925-1951.
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of the forty-company sample to adopt it. The war affected its adop-
tion, and not until 1946 can it be said that the number of orders
reached the stride of maximum rates of annual investment. It re-
mains to be seen how long this phase will last.
The adoption of the freight road diesel spread faster than any
other of the major innovations except air conditioning, once the
inertia of those accustomed to steam was overcome. Table 8 indi-
cates the relevant history:
In four years after its first general use, half of the forty sample
roads had ordered units; in eleven years, all but four.19 Of these
four, three were roads over half of whose revenue came from haul-
ing bituminous coal. This rapid spread can be credited basically to
the diesel's superlative service and economical characteristics com-
pared with its immediate steam predecessors. Yet it had taken
twelve years to move from the first high-speed experimental road
unit to a generally marketable one, with the main technical problems
to be solved not being difficult. It seems to have taken the entrance of
a powerful firm outside the regular locomotive-building field to
overcome the inertia of builders and railroads associated with steam.
Of the remaining innovations, data with respect to orders are not
compiled, but data for installation and individual-firm adoption,
except in two cases, are published and are tabulated below (table
9). The difficulty of identifying streamlined alloy-steel passenger
cars and differentiating them from intermediate types prevents
tabulation of sufficiently reliable data for this one item.
Car retarders and centralized traffic control (C.T.C.) have been
innovations that were siow to take hold, and it is not clear yet what
their maximum utilization will be. Retarders were particularly
sensitive to the effects of contractions in traffic volume because an
individual installation represented a lump investment of millions of
dollars. The recent increase in yard costs relative to road costs has
added to the retarder's relative drawing power for the future. C.T.C.
is unique among the ten innovations mentioned in that it may fre-
quently be capital saving as well as labor saving since it provides
increased road capacity without additional track. With growing
traffic, multiple track can be avoided; and with declining traffic,
19should be noted that a further refinement in diesel design came in 1948
with the road switchers that could be used in all types of service. This makes
the data for specialized types of diesels not fully comparable after 1948 with
those for before 1948. It appears that a few late-ordering roads may purchase
just the road-switcher type and other roads may turn to it for the majority of
their future orders.
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TABLE 8





Companies in forty-road sample




1940 8 AT&SF, GN 2
1941 171 B&O, S, SAL, CMStP&P, D&RG,
WP, NH
10
1942 4J9b B&M, NYC, ACL, IC, CB&Q, 17
NP,MP .
1943 270 E, DL&W, LV, R, CRI&P 22
1944 195 StLSW, C&NW 24
1945 323 MKT, KCS 28
1946 484 P, CGW, SP, UP 30
1947 891 StLSF, FEC 32
1948 1,085 CofNJ, LN, TP, W 36
1949 620 — 38
1950 1,492 NC&StL 37
a Aroad locomotive may consist of from two to four units, road switchers not
included.
b Breaking point.
Source: Railway Age, Annual Statistical Numbers, 1941-1951.
third and second tracks can be abandoned. Yet not until thirteen
years after the first adoption did this innovation blossom as a major
capital item—then primarily in response to the war traffic increases.
As in the case of the retarders, the future extent of installation of
C.T.C. remains to be seen, but increasing unit labor costs are sure
to create strong incentives for its adoption.
Air conditioning and freight brakes represent innovations with
unit capital costs smaller than those of the others. In the middle
1930's air conditioning cost around $8,000 per car and freight brakes
$160 for conversion and $175 per new car.2° Air conditioning reflects
competitive forces strong enough to condense the initial adoption
period tremendously and, in spite of depression conditions, to push
to the maximum annual rate of installation within four years of
commercial availability. The AB air brake was in marked contrast.
In spite of strong technical, trade association, and regulatory pres-
sures for universal application, after six years 107 out of 192 railroad
companies had no cars equipped,2' and nine years elapsed before an
annual rate of application was reached that would equip all cars
20 Wall Street Journal, September 25, 1944, p. 4.
21. Railway Age, vol. 106, April 15, 1939,p. 862.
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in twenty years. In addition, the rate of application was very sensi-
tive to business fluctuations.
It seems to be possible to make a few generalizations regarding
the relation of innovation to investment in road and equipment.
There is a considerable lag, to be measured in years, between the
commercial availability of an innovation and a high rate of invest-
ment in it. Innovations of the type here considered have wide
enough appeal so that most companies could find adoption desirable,
yet invariably only a small group of companies make expenditures
for them in the initial years of adoption. My own observation of a
number of roads suggests that this is due to reluctance to give up
commitments to old ways and change to new ways of doing things,
and to some extent to a desire to wait and get the advantage of
refinements upon the original innovation. However, there are some
pioneering spirits and some upon whom special pressures for adop-
tion can be brought, who comprise the first few purchasers. They
will do the trying out, and if the innovation has something to offer
the others will follow. During the years of adoption, improvements
will be made and advantages that were not obvious initially will be
discovered, both of which help overcome the inertia of the more
conservative. It appears that for a substantial number of innovations
there is likely to be a sharp break from the initial piecemeal adop-
tion by a few odd companies, with a relatively low level of annual
investment, to a subsequent high level, which begins with a large
number of potential users rushing to adopt the innovation within a
rather brief period. This breaking point is marked in tables for the
year in which it occurred. At the breaking point, annual orders or
installations treble or increase even more. This higher rate then
lasts for a goodly number of years, except when war or general
contraction occurs. The longest span in the cases presented has been
that for continuous-track-circuit automatic signal systems, the short-
est for air conditioning.
There seems to be no evidence that the timing of the appearance
of the first commercial offering of an innovation is related to any
particular phase of economic fluctuation. Even if there were, it
would have little significance in accounting for investment variations
because it has been shown that substantial amounts of investment
are not made on an innovation until some years after the initial
offering.
The timing of the break between the scattered, small-scale in-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN RAILROADS
the first year of expanded orders (or acquisition where order data
are not available) in table 10. The position of this year relative to
the timing of general contraction and expansion is shown also, to
find if any relationships might be indicated between expanded in-
vestment in innovations and phases of business fluctuations.
Of the seventeen instances of increased rates of orders for capital
expenditure two showed no clear break, ten occurred during expan-
sion, five during contraction. In a sense itis surprising that the
fifteen that showed a breaking point did not break in periods of
expansion, because increased rates of investment in general are
thought of as a major element of expansion. In this connection it is
of interest to review the position in each phase, contraction or
expansion, in which the increase of expenditure for each innovation
was decided upon. It would appear that only three—that is, the
freight air brake, the mountain passenger locomotive, and air condi-
tioning—moved into high-level investment orders at the beginning
of general expansion. Three—automatic signals, four-wheel trailing-
truck passenger locomotives, and AB freight brakes—made the step
at the end of expansions. The rates of investment orders for these
three were immediately curtailed in line with the general contrac-
tion. The mikado locomotive and road passenger diesel came
forward in the last year of a two-year contraction; the four-wheel
trailing-truck freight locomotive in a single year of contraction. The
increase in orders for Pacific type passenger locomotives and steel
passenger cars occurred in the first year of a two-year contraction,
and orders increased still further in the second year. The rest came
in the middle years of expansion. The general impression conveyed
by all this is that the influence of innovation on increasing rates of
investment cannot be demonstrated as being tied to any particular
phases, or parts of phases, of business fluctuation. One cannot make
a case that these innovations generally led to upturns in railroad
investment.
The fact that some innovations, such as the Pacific and mikado
locomotives and later the four-wheel trailing-truck freight type,
have worked up to a high level of investment during contractions,
suggests that highly attractive innovations can break into high rates
of adoption and keep up a part of capital expenditure during
contraction.
It should be noted that during an expansion, increased investment
for any particular type of equipment includes larger expenditures
for the tried and tested older types as well as for the recent innova-
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TABLE 10
TIMING OF BREAK TO MAXIMUM RATES OF INVESTMENT
FOR VAruous INNOVATIONS
POSITION OF YEAR OF INCREASED







rate of rate of cycle phase
Innovation ordersinstallation chronology involved
Freight air brakes — 1891/1892aOrders probablyFirst year of
in expansion 1% years
Automatic signal system 1907 Orders probablyLast ofyears
in expansion
Pacific locomotive 1910 Contraction First year of
2 years
All-steel passenger cars 1910 Contraction First year of
2 years
Mikado locomotive 1911 Contraction Second year of
2 years
Santa Fe locomotive 1916 Expansion Second year of
years
Mallet locomotive No break —
Mountainpassenger
locomotive 1922 Expansion First year of
years
Retarders — Nobreak —
Four-wheeltrailing-truck
freight locomotive 1927 Contraction First year of
1 year
Four-wheel trailing-truck
passenger locomotive 1929 Expansion Last half-year
Air conditioning 1934 Expansion Orders first year
ofyears
AB freight air brakes 1937 Orders probablyLast year of
in expansion 43& years
Diesel switcher locomotive1941 Expansion Latter years
of expansion
Diesel road freight
locomotive 1942 Expansion Latter years
of expansion
Centralized traffic control 1942 Expansion Latter years
of expansion
Diesel road passenger
locomotive 1946 Contraction Last of 2 years
aFiscalyear.
Sources: Data from previous tables and text, except those for all-steel pas-
senger cars, for which the source is Railway Review, vol. 54, p. 822, and
mountain type passenger locomotive orders (1918, 53; 1919, 0; 1920, 44;
1921, 26; 1922, 122; 1923, 127; 1924, 52), for which the source is Railway
Age, Annual Statistical Issues, 1919-1925.
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tions. An early instance of this occurs in the locomotive orders of
1911 through 1913. In 1912 and 1913, both years of expansion,
orders for the consolidation type of locomotive increased at the
same time as orders for its successor, the mikado. Similarly, there
were more orders for both the ten-wheel type and the Pacific in 1912
than there had been in 1911. In the case of the consolidation type,
TABLE 11
ORDERS OF SELECT TYPES OF
Nonrn AMERICAN RAILROADS
Con.wlidation Mikado Ten-wheel Pacific
1911 577 590 238 486
1912 585 1,309 364 594
1918 823 796 255 566
1914 116 333 148 174
Source:RailwayMechanicalEngineer,vol. 92, January1918, p. 59.
orders reached a secondary peak greater in number than that of the
mikado in the second year of the expansion, because of the fact that
the new mikado type had reached its stride in orders.
In the next decade, a near peak of 1,004 orders (from forty sample
companies only) for the mikado came in 1922, during the expansion
of 1921-1923, when that type in turn was about to be overtaken by
newly developed types. Where it is possible to differentiate clearly
between the categories of new and obsolescent items, it appears that
large investment in the obsolescent types may be the order of the
day during expansion.
Age of Capital Inventory
Obviously, if a railroad company were totally equipped in a single
year with completely new and up-to-date locomotives, cars, bridges,
rails, and other necessary capital items, and if no traffic changes or
innovations were expected, there would be no demand for capital
equipment in the following year. A one-year average age of capital
items leaves no room for investment expenditure under stable condi-
tions. Such a situation has never occurred, but the concept suggests
the possibility that the age of capital items could have something
to do with variation in demand for investment expenditure. Un-
fortunately for ease of empirical analysis, many capital items do not
have a single use throughout their life; rather, they usually start in
some sort of first-class service, then are transferred to a second, and
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later to a third and even a lower, status. Most passenger road loco-
motives and cars have first been put on crack trains, then moved to
other main-line services, then to secondary trains and peak-load
main-line service, and finally to branch-line trains with still some use
in higher grades of service during such peaks as Christmas and
Labor Day. Boxcars, with few exceptions, are not tagged for particu-
lar trains, but top-condition cars are used for loading freight of
exacting types and later are assigned only for rougher types of
commodities, finally being used in company service. For locomotives
and cars these stages have added up to thirty or forty years of
service before retirement. Rail starts its life on tracks carrying fast,
heavy traffic, then it is removed and placed in secondary lines, and
finally finds its way to yard tracks, branch lines, or some other
railroad, possibly seeing service of some sort for as long as forty or
fifty years. Even the steel work of bridges has occasionally seen
more than one use. Stations and grading represent items that seldom
offer the possibility of reuse by railroads.
On an individual railroad it is sometimes possible to trace particu-
lar items of the capital inventory through these stages and see the
effects of inventory age on particular categories of capital demand,
though actual flexibility in use, vagueness of classification, and
external forces of change in traffic volume, of competition, and of
innovation, even in the simple case, tend to confuse the basic issue.
The history of cars and road locomotives on the New Haven Rail-
road illustrates what can be deduced from examination of an indi-
vidual firm. Upon the introduction of the all-steel passenger car,
the New Haven ordered 355 steel coaches,22 from 1913 to 1917. The
total inventory of coaches was 1,700, of which over 425 had a wood
or steel underframe, having been purchased in the seven years pre-
ceding 1913; the remaining 920 were pre-1906. Thus, a little under
one half of the coaches in 1917 were less than eleven years old. After
the advent of the all-steel car, no other basic innovations in passen-
ger cars appeared for some time. Thirteen years of no purchases
elapsed before 100 new coaches were ordered in 1929, these being
of the orthodox heavy steel construction but equipped with roller
bearings. At this time there were still over 800 non-all-steel coaches
on the roster. From 1934 to 1938, 200 of an early type of lightweight,
air-conditioned steel coach were ordered. In 1945, 100 of the most
advanced, stainless-steel-exterior type were ordered, by which time
22Combinationsof coach with baggage or mail compartments are- included.
Electric suburban equipment is excluded.
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the 1913-1916 steel. cars were in secondary service although some
had been air-conditioned. The 300 latest cars, which had an average
age of about eight years by the time the last 100 were placed in
operation, would appear to have satisfied the current needs of first-
line service and some secondary requirements. Barring an upward
change in expected traffic or in service standards, there would
appear to be no immediate further demand for new passenger
In the case of boxcars, the New Haven provides, for a single item,
the nearest approximation to be found on any railroad of the hypo-
thetical case mentioned at the start of this section. Due to suddenly
changed external factors, the New Haven bought some 20,000 box-
cars from 1902 to 1912, thus increasing its inventory nearly fourfold.
Not another new boxcar was ordered for thirty years, although
several thousand were rebuilt to meet changed standards.
The passenger-locomotive history of this railroad shows some
possible variations of the influence of inventory age on investment.
Starting the century with about 450 steam passenger locomotives,
the years 1900-1907 saw 125 more of the then-standard types
ordered. In 1906 two innovations made their impress on New Haven
locomotive ordering: one was electrification, which accounted for the
installation of forty-one passenger locomotives; the other was the
two-wheel trailing truck for higher-capacity firebox and boiler
design, which led to the ordering initially of forty-two additional
steam locomotives. Thirty of the latter were the previously men-
honed Pacffic type. In 1910, two more were ordered, then fifty-six
more in 1912 and 1913, and fifty in 1915, a total of 138 of this type
in nine years. Not another steam passenger locomotive was pur-
chased for twenty years, and then only ten of the new four-wheel
trailing-truck type in 1936 to haul the heaviest main-line trains. The
electric locomotives ordered in 1906 were confined to main-line
service and were overtaken by obsolescence as passenger-train
weights increased, particularly with the adoption of steel cars. Five
of a new electric type, each equivalent to two of the original, were
ordered in 1919, followed by twenty-two more of a larger type
during the subsequent ten years.
These are examples from an individual firm's history that could
be repeated many times over from the histories of other companies.
But it does not necessarily follow that the age position of the stock
28NewYork, New Haven and Hartford R.R. Co., Annual Reports, 1912 to
date.
186CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN RAILROADS
of capital of the railroad industry as a whole has such an obvious
influence on variations of capital expenditure. The overstocking or
understocking of the individual firms might occur at such diverse
times that the individual irregularities would fully balance out.
Regional differences in traffic variation and profitability, varying
degrees of innovation acceptance, and chance changes in manage-
ments would be factors tending toward dispersion of individual
inventory positions. On the other hand, there are industry-wide
influences, principally national variationsin level of economic
activity, requirements of war, and the most broadly attractive inno-
vations, which would tend to make individual-firm decisions con-
verge. The difficulty of determining the relative strength of these
forces in actual practice lies in the fact that they all work simul-
taneously so that at no time can one or two be isolated for study.
If numerical valuation of these forces were possible, multiple regres-
sion analysis could extract us from this difficulty, but attractiveness
of an innovation and degree of inertia (or progressiveness) clearly
defy numerical valuation.
One method of analyzing the performance of groups of companies
is to take geographical aggregations of companies, so that the effects
of regional variations on inventory and investment would be distin-
guishable. One of the few compilations of data available for in-
dustry-wide analysis that approaches completeness is for locomo-
tives. This was first published with the 1932 statistics of the ICC in
the form of a locomotive inventory for Class I railroads, classified by
age of building. The following table presents a summary of histori-
cal data for acquisition of road freight locomotives, steam and elec-
tric, separated as tO the three geographical divisions of the country's
railroads, with at least thirty companies in each group. The periods
taken are of ten-year length, except that 1930 is included with the
twenties because the decisions relating to it were associated with
that earlier decade.
It will be seen that the eastern railroads acquired the highest
proportion of new locomotives from 1910 to 1919 inclusive, relative
to rate of growth, while the West acquired the lowest. Although
this might suggest that in this period the eastern railroads had over-
stocked and the western understocked, there was no noticeable
effect on acquisition of new locomotives in the following period.
The eastern group acquired the same proportion relative to its
inventory as did the western, even though there was no traffic in-
crease in the East and a 10 per cent advance in the West. Nor did
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TABLE 12
FREIGHT LOCOMOTIVE INVENTORY AND BUILDING BY DECADES, 1900-1940
CLASS I RAILROADS
EasternSouthernWestern
Number of companies, 1932 53 33 65
Net additions, 1900-1910 inclusive
(fiscal years)a







Change in net ton-miles, 1900-1910
(fiscal years)
Estimated built, 1910-1919 inclusive (fiscal
+67% +98% +92%
years before, calendar years after, 1916)b6,600 5,900 14,400
Proportion built, 1910-1919, to stock, 1914 39% 36% 28%
Change in net ton-miles, 1911-1919° +32% +55% +65%
Built 1920-1930 inclusived 2,841 1,728 2,451
Stock at middle of period, 1925 17,000 6,350 14,750
Proportion built, 1920-1930, to stock, 1925 17% 27% 17%
Change in net ton-miles, 1920-1929 0% +18% +10%
Built 1931-1940 inclusive 337 71 230
Stock at middle of period, 1935 11,800 5,100 11,200
Proportion built, 1931-1940, to stock, 1985 2.9% 1.4% 2.0%
Change in net ton-miles, 1929-1940 —21.0% —7.0% —16.0%
a Thenumber built by districts and for Class I railroads is not available for
1900-1910, so net additions by districts, which are available, are shown as a
relative gauge of building.
b Estimated from ownership in 1932 of locomotives built in that decade.
CTrafficstatistics are not comparable by districts before and after 1910, so
1911 data are used for second section. Definition of districts for locomotive data
somewhat differed for 1900-1910 period from that for later periods.
d Locomotives ordered in each successive period had substantial increases in
capacity, from that of 1910-1919 to that of 1920-1980, probably over 50 per
cent per unit.
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways in the US.,
particularly statement 8D, 1982, and table 17, 1940, by calculation.
the acquisitions of the prior decade, that is, 1900-1910, suggest for
the Eastern roads an earlier deficient program that might have
resulted in greater needs from 1910 to 1919. Southern railroad
acquisitions in each of the two periods were the greatest relative to
inventory, presumably due to greater average rate of traffic growth
from 1900 to 1930. In the decade 1931-1940, just before the diesel
entered the picture, when all districts showed traffic decreases, the
South the least and the East the greatest, the southern railroad
acquisitions were at the lowest rate, possibly showing excess pur-
chases earlier. The eastern were the greatest, which did not reflect
either decline in traffic or relative weakness financially. The effect
of innovation in the East may have been greater with the electrifica-
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tion during this last period of a large section of the Pennsylvania,
accounting for the acquisition of 160 electric locomotives.
If this type of analysis is carried on with shorter time periods a
somewhat different view develops. The statistics for the decade of
the 1920's are broken into two parts in the following table:
TABLE 13




Proportionbuilt,1920-1924,tostock,1925 10 15 11
Proportionbuilt,1925-1929,tostock,1925 6 9 4
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways in the U.S.,
table 8D, 1932, by calculation.
The acquisitions of the first five-year period seem excessive in
terms of previous experience adjusted for the declining rates of
traffic growth. The much smaller purchases for all districts in the
subsequent five years are significant. If the locomotive innovations in
the previous section are recalled, one can guess that purchases after
1924 can be attributed largely to the advantages of new types. By
the end of 1924 the stock according to the then acceptable technical
standards was full, and, with no new developments, locomotive
purchases might have dropped far more precipitately than they did.
But it must be remembered that, particularly with respect to annual
orders, other factors beside age of stock influence orders and acquisi-
tions. The new peaks of freight traffic in several of the years in the
early 1920's were an incentive to addition, and after 1922 the fin-
proved financial position of the railroads was a significant influence.
But after 1926 there was no general increase in traffic. In tenns of
these periods shorter than decades the effect of age of stock seems
more visible.
This suggests that annual acquisitions may be related to the
acquisitions of a limited number of immediately previous years,
these additions being representative of the first-line inventory rather
than of the total. The following table shows annual acquisitions of
freight locomotives by districts for all roads and the orders by dis-
tricts for the earlier mentioned forty-road sample.
Among districts, there were ten district-years (for which figures
are italicized) in which orders more than doubled the average of
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TABLE 14
FREICHT LocoMoTIvE BUILDING FOR CLASS I COMPANIES AND ORDERS












1920 232 166 151 97 525a 908 670
1921 25 150 15 79 100 218 140 447
1922 546 252 341a120 499a 156 1,386 528
1923 635a935a 207 440a 206 677a 1,0482,052
1924 221 287 229 227 159 218 609 732
1925 161 102 273 131 101 102 585 335
1926 255 245 167 343a 142 138 564 726
1927 80 142 63 37 94 130 239 309
1928 190 90 24 68 70 70 284 228
1929 245 267 10 25 258 184 508 426
Average 259 264 148 157 215 225 622 645
a Yearsin which orders more than doubled the average.
Sources: Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways in the U.S.,
1932, table 8D; Railway Age, Annual Statistical Issues, 1921-1930, by calcu-
lation.
all the years. Surprisingly enough, these peak years were not
usually followed immediately by years in which either building or
orders were much out of line with the decade's annual averages. Out
of the ten cases, the southern peak building of 1926 and the western
peak orders of 1920 provided the two exceptions. Excepting a year
like 1921, when price expectations controlled decisions, it took the
cumulative effect of several years of average and extra-large acquisi-
tions to bring about a substantially below-average year of orders—
in the East, it was three years; in the South, five; and in the West,
four. In the East, the number built in itsseries of peak years
amounted to 9 per cent of the midperiod inventory; in the South,
20 per cent; and in the West, 10 per cent. It was in the South, with
proportionately twice the building of the other sections, that the
most drastic cut in orders followed the peak years. For groups of
firms, excessive additions for a single year do not appear to have
much effect on subsequent ordering, but for several cumulative
years seem to be influential.
Regional comparisons are hardly profitable with respect to freight-
car inventory and acquisitions. The interest of individual companies
is so much influenced by the country-wide car situation because of
the free interchange of cars that regional differences are not likely
to be significant from the point of view of the question at hand. But
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it is worth testing some of the conclusions suggested by the loco-
motive data for car acquisitions for the country as a whole, noting
certain basic differences at the start. Rebuilding has been a more
general practice with cars than with locomotives. The difficulties of
uniform and meaningful definition of rebuilding have prevented col-
lection of adequate data concerning this practice, and its effect on
new-car building cannot be ascertained. Innovations have not been
as significant a factor in freight cars as in locomotives, though new
types of traffic needs have called for the addition of new specialized
forms of cars, such as automobile-box and cement-hopper cars, and
there has also been pressure to install cars with larger capacity.
Table 15 gives the available data on car building and orders for all
United States purchasers, railroad and other, for the same ten-year
period just presented for locomotives, together with the total figures
of the previous decade and indices of demand for and supply of cars.
TABLE 15
























































a Firstthree years of decade total include Canadian cars.
Source: Railway Age, Annual Statistical Issues, 1921-1930.
By the middle of the decade beginning in 1920, some 2.7 million
freight cars were owned in the United States. Some 41 per cent of
the cars owned in 1920 had been built in the immediately preceding
decade. The depreciation rates indicate an average life of something
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over thirty years, and inventory studies of 1945 for the 1.8 million
Class I cars owned by the railroads indicated that cars were then on
the average around twenty years old, with 19 per cent of cars over
thirty years of age.24 This would suggest that in recent years from
one thirtieth to one fortieth of the inventory might be normal annual
building with minor or no traffic growth and only gradual change in
utilization of cars. The 1910-1919 period had represented substantial
growth. From 1920 to 1929 there was much less growth, only 8 per
cent, and gradually better utilization was obtained. In the latter
period, on a thirty-year life basis, 90,000 cars a year, and on a forty-
year basis, 67,500 cars would be the limits of building to maintain in-
ventory. A thirty-five year life would give an annual need of 77,000.
But here we note that acquisitions of new cars for 1920, 1921,
and 1922 were below normal and that, in the previous decade, 1918
was below with only 67,000. On the 77,000 basis, these four years
produced a deficit of 74,000. However, the orders of a single year,
1922, or the building of 1928, more than made up this deficit.
These early years of the decade were years in which other factors
than inventory played an important part in purchase decisions.
Table 15 shows record peaks of carloadings in 1920 and again in
1928. Severe shortages started in July 1919, continued through 1920,
but disappeared in the winter. Large surpluses developed in 1921
with the decline in traffic. The surpluses turned to shortages after
July 1922, with traffic increasing and a shopman's strike of that
month leading to a rapid rise in unserviceable cars. By July 1923
the shortages had again been worked off, and a large surplus
appeared in December. Car prices had been at peak levels in 1920
(three times the prewar basis) but fell rapidly in 1921 and by
February 1922 were down 40 per cent. They rose to somewhat
higher levels during the rest of the year and early 1923. In 1920 the
railroads had had their last year of government control with ex-
penses exceeding revenue for much of the year. By the middle of
July 1922 the two were brought into line, and net income was in-
creasingly favorable in 1922 and 1923. For the rest of the decad.e
shortages disappeared, large surpluses were usual, car prices were
stable, and net income favorable. There were three successive years
of substantially above-normal building from 1923 to 1925.
Beginning in 1926 there were three years of orders below the
77,000 level. The inventory factor was in a position to be the con-
24 ICC, op.cit., 1940, table 96; American Railway Car Institute, op.cit., 1945,
pp. 45-48.
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trolling factor. This is again an indication that several years of over-
buying are necessary before the inventory position seems to have
any effect. But the following year, 1929, found orders again above
any of the alternative "nonnal" requirements. By the end of that
year, out of a total stock of about 2,640,000 cars, 82 per cent had been
built within ten years and some 74 per cent within twenty years. This
does not take into account the improvement of the inventory by a
very substantial volume of rebuilding of still older cars. Whether
the following years' decline in orders reflects this inventory position
more than the falling off of traffic, profits, and credit must remain
the "$64 question." The chances are that, even if these last-men-
tioned factors had remained favorable, the rate of orders would not
have remained at 1929 levels for more than a year or so at best.
Even as recently as the years following World War II, short-run
overbuying seemed to have preceded a drop in orders though other
factors weighed more heavily than in the 1926-1929 period. With
something under 1.8 million freight cars owned or leased by Class I
railroads each year from 1940 to 1950 and assuming a thirty-five
year average life, an even rate of replacement, other things equal,
would be some 51,000 cars. New-freight-car acquisitions for the
period 1943 to 1946 fell 61,000 short of this. But in 1947, 55,548; in
1948, 95,979; and in 1949, 80,815 cars were acquired, totaling 79,000
in excess of the rate of replacement. In the following year, 1950,
only 40,000 cars were acquired. Actual orders (for all owners) had
dropped from 120,163 in 1947, to 92,782 in 1948, to 6,223 in 1949.
But, as in the early 1920's, inventory position did not operate alone.
Beginning in November and December 1948, carloadings tapered
off from 1947 levels; in the spring of 1949 they were 10 per cent
below the previous year and by the last quarter more than 20 per
cent. Net income for 1949 was 37 per cent less than for 1948.25
The earlier history of freight-car building provides an unusual
opportunity for seeing if large orders in several successive years
have any influence at the far end of the life span when the cars so
ordered might be expected to come up for retirement. In the three
years 1905 through 1907 some 650,000 cars were built, against a
stock of railroad and private cars that was on the order of 1.9 million
cars at the beginning of the period.26 Some thirty years later, begin-
fling in about 1935, the need for retiring this great block of cars
might have increased the demand for new cars. In 1982 statistics
25 American Railway Car Institute, op.cit., 1950, pp. 1, 4, 24, 34, 42.
26 ibid., 1945, p. 4.
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of withdrawal of old cars together with installation of newly built
















Source: Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways in the U.S.,
1941, table 40.
In the first half of the period covered by the table, the car owner-
ship of the railroads was being reduced from 2.3 million to 1.8
million, the latter number being found roughly sufficient to handle
even the peak requirements of World War II. The heavy with-
drawals of 1933 to 1936 were not matched by new acquisitions in
the same years.
The decline in traffic in the 1930's had more to do with the volume
of retirements in that decade than the coming of the end of the life
span of the large group of cars acquired thirty years earlier. It is
common knowledge that timing of retirement is most likely to be
chosen for reasons of financial expediency and effect, rather than
beOause of the age of the units. Also, as has been pointed out earlier,
the extent of second- and third-line use is very flexible. There is a
wide range within which managerial judgment can decide to re-
build, or replace with modern cars; to continue repairing, or replace
with a completely new unit; to meet peak demands with very old
cars, or provide new cars so that less old cars are available for peaks.
The first alternatives may produce extreme contrasts; for example,
one large railroad in its 1945 inventory showed 80 per cent of its
hopper cars as being over thirty years old, while another showed
substantially none of that age. There was little evidence of a demand
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for new cars commensurate with any age group calculated to come
up for retirement.
By way of summary, in the case of the railroads the stock of
capital goods that is involved in the greatest volume of capital
expenditures in recent years, equipment, has had an average life of
thirty to forty years. This inventory has, to varying degrees, felt the
pressure of a succession of innovations. There have been numerous
ups and downs in traffic and in financial circumstances. In addition
to these variables, the possibility of rebuilding, of improving, and
of expanding or contracting repairs, as well as of lower-class use
makes the latter years of the life span extremely flexible in response
to other influences than just the age of the capital good itself. Such
effects of inventory age position as can be seen appear to originate
with the status of the beginning part of the life span of the units or,
to say it in another way, with the acquisitions of the immediate past
few years. At times short-run traffic expectations and immediate
financial considerations loom larger in investment decision making
than the over-all inventory age position. At other times in the short
range, inventory deficits or surfeits of recently built, modern first-
line units can have a noticeable influence. From the point of view of
regularization this should make the problem somewhat easier and
more readily comprehended. It suggests that orders for a year or a
relatively short period of years could be judged excessive in terms of
some rough proportion of first-class inventory. When orders or
acquisitions appear excessive in these terms they can be expected to
result in a significant subsequent reduction of capital expenditure,
unless very strong contrary factors, like particularly compelling
innovations or a war, appear. If an effort to achieve regularization is
to be made, the total orders for a year or group of years should be
limited to some appropriate proportion of first-line inventory.
Differences among Particular Items of Capital Expenditure
One of the most striking things in analyzing the variations over time
of railroad capital expenditures is the difference in the degree of
variation among the diverse kinds of capital goods. Since statistics
of orders for all roadway expenditures are not available, it is neces-
sary to review these variations in terms of expenditure rather than
orders. The first data available for gross capital expenditure item by
item are for 1922, but from 1922 to 1928 inclusive, the separately
itemized categories are limited in number. These data are sum-
marized in table 17 and the following chart.
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Chart2
Annual Gross Capital Expenditures
Class I Railroads
Virtually all the items conform to the direction of change in total
expenditure between its troughs and peaks. This is true for the
complete list of items through the peak of 1929-1980, the trough of
1933, the peak of 1937, the trough of 1938, the peak of 1941, and
then, excluding the war years, the peak of 1948-1949 to the trough
of 1950. The only significant exception was in 1950, when the
number of locomotives installed was half as many again as the
average of 1948-1949, while there was an 18 per cent drop intotal
expenditure. The exception may be accounted for by the attractive-
ness of the innovation of the diesel-electric locomotive.
Table 17 shows the difference among items in terms of ratios of
peaks to troughs and the reverse. Due to price changes from year to
year, these ratios do not indicate the absolute changes over long
periods in amounts of physical units added, but the price changes
as between items during the short spread of years covered ineach
column do not vary sufficiently to prevent comparison of one item
with another by use of the ratios.
It is at once apparent from table 17 that equipment expenditures
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fluctuate much more widely than roadway expenditures, except for
the effect, of diesel-locomotive purchases in 1937 and 1950. Of the
equipment items freight cars present the extreme ranges. For road-
way the two pairs of items shops and engine houses, and signals
and communication are the least stable, and bridges and trestles the
TABLE 17
RELATIONSHIPS OF TROUGHS AND PEAKSOFPARTICtJLAE

















Locomotives 6 1,180 66 200 150











Total equipment 5 2,080 36 320 82
Roadway:
Additionalmain track 4(1934)100(1934)75 170 n.a.










Additional ballast 13 240 67 180 n.a.
Shops and engine houses 7 570 55 180 n.a.
Stations and office buildings 12 190 48 140 n.a.











Total roadway 16 210 60 160 82
Grand total 12 1,190 44 240 82
a Figuresfor locomotives, freightcars,and passenger cars are ratios of units
acquired, expenditure data not being available.
n.a.: Not available.
Sources: Two publications of the Association of American Railroads, Bureau
of Railway Economics: AReview of Railway Operations, 1926to date; Railway
Supplies and Capital Expenditures, 1930,p. 20; by calculation.
most. Heavier rail showed the least decline in the long downturn
to 1932, bridges the least in the short one of 1938. Miscellaneous
items proved relatively stable among roadway items. Freight cars
showed the greatest decline to 1932 and in 1938, but passenger cars
fell more in the 1950 dip.
The important thing in this analysis is not that there are these
differences but rather what causes them. There are several technical
factors that provide explanation. First, with a drop in tralBc a
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specific part of the stock of equipment is taken out of service and
becomes definitely, even visibly, surplus. For instance, by 1932
almost one fifth of the locomotives were stored in serviceable condi-
tion, and the proportion of those held awaiting repairs was half again
as big as the proportion so held in 1929, making in effect a 30 per
cent surplus. In 1932 the average daily surplus of freight cars was
almost 700,000 or about one third of the stock. In contrast, roadway
and structures are not generally taken out of service for any short-
term fluctuation. If only one train is operated each day, the track,
bridges, and stations are still used. There is nothing completely idle
and no units are specifically surplus. Maintenance, even at greatly
reduced levels, still has to be carried On; all facilities must be kept
up and operating expenses associated with them must be incurred.
Rails are renewed and there is still an incentive to replace with
heavier types and so incur capital expenditure. There is hardly any
such thing as having a surplus of heavy rail in main-line tracks.
Switches still have to be thrown, and the opportunity for saving by
installing spring switches, for instance, still exists.
Second, in the case of traffic peaks, equipment lacks are more
critical than shortages of roadway facilities. Freight cars are a
particularly sensitive item. Their lack when shippers want to load
is an obvious and specific deficiency and is a signal for active
protest. Serious inadequacy of supply leads to investigation by
regulatory agencies and often to vigorous political activity. Inade-
quacy of other equipment is far less obvious publicly even though
it may contribute to car shortage. With roadway, lack of capacity
is publicly highlighted still less. It leads to delays, for instance, that
are known to shippers and are irritating, but they create direct
results less critical than inability to load freight. The tendency then
is to remedy insufficiencies of facilities with a speed related to the
amount of protest aroused; deficient locomotive stock is therefore
subject to less pressure for quick remedy than shortage of freight
cars, most types of roadway facilities to less than shortage of
locomotives.
Third, there are a number of articles used in maintenance of way
that in the course of repairs are almost invariably replaced by im-
proved types. Again, in the case of main-line rail little added work
is involved in replacing lighter types with heavier. Thus any rail
maintenance is accompanied by complementary capital expenditure.
Likewise bridges, up to the advent of the diesel, were invariably
made stronger when replaced or rebuilt. In the case of freight cars
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and locomotives, the majority of part renewals are in kind and so
involve no capital investment.
Finally, major roadway and structure projects take longer periods
to complete than does the building of equipment. Once undertaken,
a project is likely to be carried on to completion. This introduces a
certain short-run stability to some of the larger nonequipment ex-
penditures.
From the financial side, the factors operate somewhat differently.
Since 1929 very little new financial capital has been raised by
mortgage or junior securities. In contrast, equipment-trust and con-
ditional-sales agreements have been a ready means for providing
seemingly unlimited funds for equipment except during the very
bottom of the 1932 trough. This has meant that capital investment
for roadway is more dependent on retained profits than is that for
equipment, for which companies put up no more than 20 to 25 per
cent cash equity in connection with borrowing. All this has led in
recent years to the possibility of greater peaks in equipment expendi-
ture than in roadway expenditure. Whether in the future the high
rate of compulsory-retirement provisions of the equipment issues
may come to press hard on cash left after expenses so that even less
will be left for roadway capital expenditures remains to be seen. If,
however, equipment financing is not overdone in expansions its high
credit standing should provide a means of facilitating equipment
financing through contractions, except those of the most severe type.
Variation among Companies as to Fluctuation of Orders
Granted that innovation, overstocking, war, and other factors may
have some effect upon the ups and downs of ordering, it should be
valuable to know whether any firms have been able to approach
regularity in their rates of ordering and whether there have been
others that have concentrated orders very heavily in peak periods.
Orders for freight cars are notorious for wide fluctuation, and, since
reasonably reliable data are available from 1920 on, these orders
make good material for analysis.
The available freight-car inventory data by five-year age groups
make possible comparisons with a theoretical uniform purchasing
rate. On the assumption that ownership was not changing greatly
and that the usual thirty- to thirty-five-year life prevailed for the
cars, it would follow that 14 to 17 per cent of cars owned at any
given time should be purchased every five years to maintain a
uniform rate over time. Examination of the Class I company data
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for 1945 back to 1915, as indicated in a 1945 inventory,27 indicates
that complete lack of, or only minimal acquisitions by, most com-
panies for the 1931-1985 period not unexpectedly disqualifies them
from even coming near to meeting any such test of regularity. The
companies most nearly approaching it, however are significant. Out
of some 140 (the number varies from year to year) Class I railroads,
8 stand out 'because their 193 1-1985 acquisitions exceeded 4 per cent
of inventory. Table 18 indicates the proportion of their 1945 inven-
tory acquired in each of six previous five-year periods. The figures
for periods prior to 1925 are somewhat deflated indexes of acquisi-
lion because some of the previously purchased cars bad begun to
be retired by 1945.
As the two averages indicate, the difference between the eight
most nearly regular companies and the other Class I companies is
very substantial. In both groups the excess proportion purchased in
the 1921-1925 period is noticeable and would be explained by in-
dustry representatives as due to the run-down condition of the
properties after World War I, increases in demand, and the desire
to make good this deficiency. In the 1931-1935 period the stable
group resisted the trends of the depression astonishingly well, the
rest acted in full accord with the feast and famine characterization.
That even 8 out of 140 companies can act so differently from the
rest should deny the attitude that nothing can be done toward regu-
larization of equipment expenditures.
The annual orders and their relationship to total domestic orders
for seven of the eight companies are presented in table 19. The two
periods 1916-1920 and 1941-1945 have been omitted because they
were influenced by war conditions. The Gulf, Mobile and Ohio has
not been tabulated because it is impossible to trace its car ownership.
It is made up of several companies whose relationships were recon-
stituted during the period here considered.
The eight companies that have been the most regular freight-car
purchasers appear to be a most diverse group. No particular scale
of operation seems to be a requirement for what regularity is
achieved, for the country's biggest company as well as two small
ones were included. The inclusion of roads with various degrees of
financial success, from one of the country's most prosperous to three
that succumbed to reorganization, furnishes no evidence that finan-
cial stability is a requirement for stable purchases. It should be
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noted that three of the roads—the Erie; New York, Chicago and
St. Louis; and Chesapeake and Ohio—were related through Van
Sweringen control to the mid-1930's. No data indicating the amount
of rebuilding that may have complemented the new acquisitions
have been published, though it is known that the Pennsylvania does
a lot of rebuilding.
The regular group, accounting for 18 to 20 per cent of total freight
cars owned, ordered less than one half of its proportion for all of
the expansion years of the 1920's but one, 1924. A more detailed
examination of the timing of orders in that year shows that two
thirds of the orders of all seven companies came in the first half of
that year during the contraction phase. In 1929, on the other hand,
most of the orders fell in the expansion part of the year. But in the
early contraction years of the 1930's the group always accounted for
more than its share. The seven roads played an even greater role in
contributing to the first years of the subsequent expansion. Begin-
ning with the fourth year of that expansion and through the fluctua-
tions of 1937-1938, the group fell short of its previous participation.
The Chicago Great Western stands out as by all odds the most regu-
lar in its purchases. The Kansas City Southern and the Chicago
Great Western were the only Class I railroads to order more than
sixteen cars in 1933. Furthermore, the Chicago Great Western acted
in the early 1930's against a sharply declining inventory.
An interesting side light on ordering in contractions is the degree
to which the most regular companies made capital expenditures at
reduced prices. The orders of that group were relatively small when
prices were high in 1920. They were completely out of the market
in 1921 when prices were declining, but placed most of their 1922
orders early while prices were still low. They did not fare so well
in 1923. The Chesapeake and Ohio had ordered 1,500 of one type
of box cars in April 1922, paying 2.7 cents a pound, f.o.b., for the
base car without extras; another 870 cost 3.2 cents in May. The
New York, Chicago and St. Louis ordered 1,000 of the same type
in June at 3.1 cents, but by October the Chicago Great Western
paid 4.0 cents for 500, and in December the Northern Pacific, 3.0
cents for 1,000. By January 1923, the Northern Pacific paid 4.1 cents
for 1,000 cars, and in May the Chicago Great Western, 4.5 cents for
300. Waiting until 1924, the Pennsylvania placed its last order, one
of the largest ever placed and divided among four manufacturers;
this order marked a downward trend in prices.
The next interesting period in the behavior of prices began in
203CAPITAL IN VESTMENT IN RAILROADS
1930, with all but the Chicago Great Western and Northern Pacific
ordering too early in the year to get the advantage of the fall price
decrease. The Chicago Great Western's 300 hopper cars ordered in
November were priced 10 per cent below the going prices in the
1925-1927 period. The 500 box cars ordered in November were
priced at the same level, but the following order in 1931 was 30 per
cent lower, and that in 1933 lower still. By 1934 the orders of the
Chesapeake and Ohio; New York, Chicago and St. Louis; and
Chicago Great Western were back to the precontraction price
levels.28
Equally as interesting as the companies supporting the market
during periods of contraction are those showing restrained ordering
during expansion. While on a thirty-year life-expectancy basis not
more than 17 per cent of the inventory should be acquired within
any five-year period, a screening of Class I companies reveals only
one road that did not exceed that rate in any of the five-year periods.
A more liberal allowance of 22 per cent for the single period and
not over 36 per cent for two adjacent periods, after 1920, shows 7
out of about 140 meeting the test. Both the Pennsylvania and the
Virginia rebuilt substantial proportions of their cars during this
period and so may not have full claim to membership in the group.
The smallness of this group of conservative purchasers suggests
that it is as usual to overorder in good times as it is to underorder
in slack times. Again rather varied types of companies appear in the
group meeting the established standard, but there is more of a
tendency than in the previous case for the prosperous roads to be
represented. Size seems not to be influential. The fact that all of the
group except the Erie had double the country-wide average (exclud-
ing the Pennsylvania) of pre-1916 cars raises a suspicion that the
earlier heavy purchases may have been a factor.
It appears that even in the case of a capital item that generally
has a widely fluctuating annual level of orders, such as freight cars,
some companies have for signfficant periods been able to even out
their ordering. The reasons why acquisition of freight. cars is likely
to vary so widely with contraction and expansion have been indi-
cated earlier in the section. Why then should some companies act
contrariwise? The biggest of the more regular companies, the Penn-
sylvania, has given considerably more thought to long-run planning
and to taking advantage of depression prices than has the average
28FederalCoordinator of Transportation, Section of Car Pooling, Freight
Train Cars: Original Cost, 1920-1934, January 22, 1935.
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TABLE 20
AGE OF 1945 CARINVENTORY













1945-1941 1525 4 19 21 5 18 18 15
1940-1936 9 8 7 8 9 17 19 12 12
1935-1931 14 2 4 1 — — — 3 2
1980-1926 22 20 4 — 6 14 7 18 20
1925-1921 12 8 9 16 18 22 16 27 25
1920-1916 17 7 16 15 21 9 10 14 14
Pre-1916 9 855541 26 33 35 19 13
Car Institute, CarBuildingand Repairs, 1945, Source: American Railway
betweenpp. 47and 49.
road. The three Van Sweringen roads with their joint consideration
of equipment problems developed long-range planning attitudes.
Beginning in 1929 the Chicago Great Western had as an associate,
and after July 1931 as a president, a forceful former executive of
the car-building industry, which may have led that road to take
advantage of depression buying and to support car building.29 But
beyond these few points picked up out of a sketchy body of common
knowledge about company policies, there is nothing in the record to
indicate why the few companies stood out among the rest. This
points up the great need for research focused on individual decision
making, company by company, with a view to ascertaining what has
led the few toward some evening out of capital expenditure com-
pared with the great mass who go to the extremes.
WhattoDo about Regularization
When it comes to discussing possibilities of regularization in light
of the factors presented in the foregoing sections, it is necessary to
start with certain working assumptions. Certainly it appears that if
the railroads were alone in attempting to regularize their capital
expenditures there would be little hope that they could do it to a
degree that would be significant for the economy as a whole. If
other sectors of the economy are to be so operated that the volume
of railroad freight traffic could decline 40 per cent in a couple of
29 Railway Age, vol.110, March 1, 1941, p. 110.
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years as it did after 1929, or 28.5 per cent from one spring to the
next as it did from 1937 to 1938, then it is hard not to be somewhat
of a defeatist within the railroad industry. But without the possibility
of a broader interest on the part of business leaders generally, the
joint effort represented by this book could hardly have been under-
taken. It is not unreasonable, thetefore, to assume that other ele-
ments of the private sector of the economy are prepared to make
some contribution toward the goal of regularization. Also it needs
to be pointed out that government in its fiscal and monetary policy
must be aiming toward the same objective, if precisely, at least
generally, in the right directions. The final assumptions are that we
need not worry about minor fluctuations and that we can take for
granted some tendency for things to even out as they go through
the different phases of ordering, production, stocking, and delivery.
From the preliminary description of the decision-making process,
it seems clear that any effective steps toward regularization must
originate with the top officers of the individual firm. These officers
must realize the importance of doing something about it and they
must feel deeply enough about the matter to be prepared as indi-
viduals to consider, long and earnestly, jointly and separately, the
possible steps to be taken in the direction of regularization. A real
challenge is presented to this group of men, the top officers, in this
matter, because certainly one of the strongest threats to continued
private operation of railroads would be marked future irregularity.
Foreign history has indicated that one of the reasons for nationaliza-
tion of railroads, particularly in Central Europe, is to make use of
their large capital expenditure possibilities as an anti-unemployment
device in the hands of the government, and a future tendency for
private management to do just the reverse might have far-reaching
consequences. But for even this challenge to provide the incentive
for the top officers to take the problem really seriously requires the
even more basic step of changing their viewpoint from the short to
the long run. As has been pointed out earlier, there are wide dif-
ferences among officers or groups of top officers in the matter of
long-range thinking, and the fact that some few really do take the
long view gives hope that others can too. In general, however, it
must be recognized that such serious projection of capital plans into
the future as has been undertaken has been pointed primarily
toward technical perfection of properties and not regularization.
Fortunately for the possibility of promoting regularization there
is considerable latitude in the decision-making process. It is not a
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sheer mechanistic affair where all that the officers do is take into
account the pertinent variables and come up with an unequivocal,
logically determined answer. Personal attitudes do affect decisions
in spite of the calculations and conclusions in capital expenditure
analyses. Major decisions are frequently made on intuitive bases,
probably more so than minor ones. Predilections of the top officers
do point decisions one way or the other. All of this provides room
for introducing regularization among the values included in the
make-up of attitudes and intuition. It could even be introduced in
the analyses. This is not to deny that in as tight a financial situation
as existed in 1932 there were real limitations on what conscious
regularization attitudes might have done. On the other hand, there
would seem to have been sufficient latitude for them to have had an
effect in the contraction of 1938 or 1950.
Assuming that a real interest in regularization of investment did
exist, what are the practical possibilities of doing something about
it? What is to be done about the cold, hard fact that the substantial
dependence of capital expenditure upon the supply of internal funds
places companies in the position of almost immediately curtailing
such expenditure the minute weakness in the economy affects traffic
volume?
There are basically two ways of circumventing this: first, one can
set up in advance, when revenues and net income are good, reserve
funds held in government or other readily saleable securities; or,
second, one can borrow after the The setting up of
such reserves for future capital expenditure runs into several oblec-
tions. It may be difficult to convince stockholders that this is to their
advantage. They may quite rightfully want dividends high enough
to make up for what they missed in the previous contractions. They
may prefer to have what cash there is while it is available rather
than to leave it lying around, held against uncertain future con-
tingencies and earning low rates of interest. In general, with stock
ownership as diffuse as it is in the railroad industry, this type of
objection should not be too difficult for managements to deal with.
Labor might provide a more serious hazard because the existence
of a large cash reserve, no matter how earmarked, could easily be
30Theeffectiveness for stability of either of these operations, for the economy
as a whole, would depend also upon from whom money was borrowed, to whom
the securities were sold, and how in turn these others acted. For instance, if
the reserves were built up by buying securities from banks it would be essential
that the banks not invest in other securities so as to provide for expansion else-
where in the economy.
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looked upon as a justification for getting more wages. It is under-
standable, then, that there has been a tendency for managements,
generally those with a real pride in adequate and up-to-date facili-
ties, to make capital improvements with cash when it is available
rather than to risk the chance of having it taken away by others and
ending up with little improvement of facilities.
On the other hand, for the first time in their history, the railroads
during World War II had the experience of building up very large
temporary cash investments, though to a substantial extent these
were intended to match increasing tax liabilities. With the increases
in cash, these investments provided important funds for postwar
capital expenditure. War conditions provided the opportunity to
accumulate the funds and probably deterred criticism of them. The
precedent might indicate the possibility of repeating the process
should opportunity arise. However, the last few years have seen
happen many of the things that explain why cash is likely not to find
its way into such funds. The high rate of capital expenditure has
taken more than all the cash that could be made available. Further,
high annual borrowing on equipment obligations to provide the
extra cash has built up a heavy obligation against future reservations
of profits, something on the order of $200 million a year, which
might otherwise have been available for a fund. They will not even
be available just to keep up the rate of capital expenditure cur-
rently. Then there has been competition for cash to provide for
retirement of maturing bonds without refunding. It is clear that it
would take a strong interest in the possibilities of regularization to
make a management try, on the financial side of things alone, to
resist all the counterpressures and temptations working against
reserve building.
The borrowing alternative runs into obvious difficulty. As traffic
turns down, earnings decline, credit standing deteriorates, and bor-
rowing may become difficult if not impossible. That thisis not
necessarily the case is indicated by the fact that in the contraction
year of 1980 the railroads greatly increased their borrowing over the
annual rates of the several previous years, managing to increase net
funded debt in the hands of the public by over $400 million and
short-turn loans by about 50 per cent, or $40 million. Bond prices
remained stable until mid-1981. This alternative was not used in the
1987-1938 contraction even though it was clear that the then popular
form of debt, the equipment-trust or conditional-sales agreement,
could have been sold at favorable interest rates. The availability of
208CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN RAILROADS
borrowing depends in part upon the increase of debt in the prior
expansion. If the resultant fixed charges and retirement require-
ments become high and require for servicing in the following con-
traction a large share of operating income, the possibility of further
debt increase is greatly reduced. The recent very rapid expansion of
equipment debt, carrying not only an interest but a high retirement
obligation, may prove a case in point. The extent to which debt can
be increased during contraction also depends upon favorable ex-
ternal factors, which points up the dependence of the railroads upon
action conducive to regularization on the part of financial institu-
tions, monetary authorities, and others. Despite this, the use of debt
to continue capital expenditure during contractions seems more
feasible than the use of reserve funds.
Separate from the financial problems related to regularized ex-
penditure are those associated with demands for new facilities
per Se. What can be done to make that demand more uniform? The
previous discussion of the inventory position of particular items
would suggest that the individual firm could look toward distributing
additions to the stock of first-line capital items more evenly over
time. If, to use a concrete example, 200 freight locomotives are
roughly the needed inventory for a company's first-class main-line
locomotives, new replacement units should not be purchased to the
full extent of the 200 within the span of just a few years. To suggest
this flies in the face of two obviously strong motives for acting to
the contrary. First, the large number of added locomotives may
appear to be needed to handle anticipated additional business. But
since the days of rapid growth of railroad traffic in the early part of
the century, increments to traffic relative to total inventory have
not been so great as to call for additions of over 10 per cent8' of the
first-class segments of the inventory within a few years. This is said
with the fact in mind that there is a large body of second- and
third-class inventory that can be called upon and temporarily up-
graded for operations from which it had previously been withdrawn.
This is not an altogether unusual practice, but to use it as an ac-
cepted expedient for the purpose of stabilizing new locomotive
purchascs does require a new point of view, though not an impossi-
ble one if top management takes seriously its long-run responsibility.
If such a policy were followed, some real protection would be
31Thismay not be the exact limit, but at whatever reasonable level it is set,
it is far below what has frequently been the practice, instances of 50 per cent
or more not being uncommon.
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needed against governmental intervention, against administrative
regulatory bodies, and, more particularly, against political pressures
of the legislative branch. This protection is needed because the
users of railroad service may raise trouble over shortages, possibly
less than up-to-the-minute levels of equipment, and something less
than the best possible service even when these conditions are
temporary. As has been indicated earlier, it has been the public's
prerogative to protest against inadequacies and to expect govern-
mental response by way of investigation, new laws, and administra-
tive orders. Top management has quite naturally become highly
sensitive to this pattern of criticism and has understandingly tended
to go all out to avoid being caught in a position that might arouse
it. Management must be given some degree of grace if it is to seek
more regular acquisitions.
The second strong motive for all-out ordering might arise with
the desire to take complete advantage of an innovation. It has been
shown that there is usually no industry-wide agreement on just when
an innovation becomes advantageous, but the tendency of the
majority to decide in its favor more or less at the same time tends
to make capital acquisitions of new types of items a problem. The
history of the freight locomotive also demonstrates that once a
given company decides the new type is advantageous there is an
urge to order enough to restock the whole, or a large share, of first-
class inventory. From the short-run point of view this is logical,
for,if the new type produces favorable unit savings, the more
locomotives installed the greater the total savings. Restocking also
permits the economies of a minimum number of types of equipment
for which to keep repair stocks and train maintenance crews, and it
makes possible lower prices when large quantities are ordered. The
other side is not so obvious:if,as has happened continuously
through the history of railroading, innovations are appearing all the
time, the company cannot without high cost keep itself supplied
with the latest if it has just put its all into one particular vintage.
Histories of individual companies are replete with examples of being
caught this way. Some have had sufficient financial resources to buy
themselves out, less opulent ones have had to live a decade or more
with their particular choice. The history of locomotive orders in 1922
arid 1923 bears this out. These years were the tail end of the life
cycle of the mikado type. One medium-sized road ordered 100
mikados in a single order in 1922 after having acquired some 200 in
the previous ten years. Not another freight locomotive was ordered
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in thirteen years. Being financially pressed, that road could not
afford to forget its 1922 commitment. Had it ordered 25 instead of
100, five years later it might well have purchased some of the
subsequent innovations to its real advantage. As it was, it could not
begin to get their benefits until 1936. In another instance a large
system ordered some 300 mikados from 1922 to 1924 after having
acquired almost that many in the previous six years. Being pros-
perous it could afford a year later, in 1925, to order 100 of a new
type replacing the mikados, but it was at a heavy cost. The tendency
for these large orders to be made late in the cycle of adoption of an
innovation results in not getting the maximum years of its advan-
tages and, except at substantial extra cost, not being prepared to
take early advantage of the next innovation. Thus the idea that
large orders enable companies to get maximum advantage from inno-
vations is in fact frequently belied. The orders often come long after
the innovations are first available and sometimes even after the
succeeding innovations are at hand. Furthermore, if a mistake in
judgment of new developments is made with a big order it is an
inordinately costly mistake, scarcely compensated for by the lower
equipment prices because of the size of the order. Even this latter
economy may be largely illusory if the large order, as so frequently
is the case, is placed at a time when everybody else is making large
acquisitions and manufacturers' capacity is overtaxed. Lower prices
even on smaller orders would be more likely when the manufacturers
are hungry for business. And more recently, with increasing stand-
ardization of equipment, the economy of manufacturing for large
individual company ordersisdiminishing. But, again, whether
caution is applied toward overstocking to meet sudden traffic de-
mands and whether full advantage is taken of innovations and price
fluctuations depend upon having a long-range view at the decision-
making level of management.
It seems clear that there are possibilities for regularization and
that there are also serious obstacles. It is equally clear that there is
considerable latitude within which the decision-making railroad
officers can work toward regularization. The critical point is how to
spread the gospel—how to get them to make the most of that lati-
tude. Some enthusiastic and persuasive officers could do much.
Leaders in the Association of American Railroads and the railroad
executive associations could effectively help the cause. The disquiet-
ing thing is that it appears easier among these groups to enlist effort
to criticize the trucking industry or labor conditions than to consider
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any such long-range problem as regularization of capital expendi-
ture. This is not to suggest that the former do not need serious con-
sideration, but it should not be to the exclusion of equally earnest
study of, and real action on, the regularization problem. It is even
likely that the attitude of long-range thinking, which this would
engender, would lead to more successful solutions of the truck and
labor problems. Finally, a real interest in regularization would in
all likeithood develop even greater latitude than there now appears
to be within which to operate for regularity.
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